Decarbonization in Democracy by Welton, Shelley
University of South Carolina 
Scholar Commons 
Faculty Publications Law School 
4-2020 
Decarbonization in Democracy 
Shelley Welton 
University of South Carolina - Columbia, swelton@law.sc.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/law_facpub 
 Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Shelley Welton, Decarbonization in Democracy, 67 UCLA L. Rev. 56 (2020). 
This Article is brought to you by the Law School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty 
Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact 
dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
67 UCLA L. Rev. 56 (2020)
U.C.L.A. Law Review    
Decarbonization in Democracy  
Shelley Welton
ABSTRACT
Conventional wisdom holds that democracy is structurally ill equipped to confront climate 
change.  As the story goes, because each of us tends to dismiss consequences that befall people in 
other places and in future times, the people cannot be trusted to craft adequate decarbonization 
policies designed to reduce present-day, domestic carbon emissions.  Accordingly, U.S. climate 
change policy has focused on technocratic fixes that operate predominantly through executive 
action to escape democratic politics—with vanishingly little to show for it after a change in 
presidential administration.
To help craft a more durable U.S. climate change strategy, this Article scrutinizes the purported 
incompatibility of decarbonization and democratic politics.  It argues that well-designed citizen 
input and control could advance U.S. efforts to address climate change, rather than hinder them. 
To foster such input and control, the Article contends that decarbonization can be disaggregated 
into three distinct questions: (1) whether to decarbonize, (2) how fast to decarbonize, and (3) how 
to decarbonize.  Although people’s tendencies to prioritize the present and the local may render 
them ill equipped to answer the first two questions, the third question, how to decarbonize, is 
different.  That question focuses on the shape we want our economy and communities to take in 
the decades to come and is thus amenable to more citizen engagement.  The Article then traces how 
more citizen engagement and empowerment on this question of how to decarbonize could advance 
decarbonization efforts.  Across partisan lines, Americans consistently prioritize clean energy to a 
degree not reflected in our national climate politics, institutions, or energy system.  These dynamics 
suggest that reforms that shift decisionmaking authority away from the energy industry, and into 
the hands of communities and citizens, have the potential to transform the political economy of 
decarbonization.
After making the case for more citizen control of decisions around how to decarbonize, the 
Article offers two complementary reforms to help achieve this aim, which venture well beyond 
the standard administrative law solution set.  It proposes that states should: (1) harness the power 
of public utility law to require utilities to better gauge and respond to their customers’ values, and 
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INTRODUCTION 
The New York Times Magazine recently devoted an entire edition to a 
seventy-page article on climate change, forebodingly entitled “Losing Earth.”1  
Ultimately, the piece essentializes the challenge as one of human nature: 
“Human beings,” it concludes, “are incapable of sacrificing present 
convenience to forestall a penalty imposed on future generations.”2  This is 
hardly a new conclusion.  Legal scholars, political scientists, psychologists, 
and philosophers have for years bemoaned the challenges of confronting 
climate change within democracy.3  Because each of us has a tendency to 
dismiss consequences that befall people in other places and in future times, it 
is feared that democratic politics are ill suited for crafting decarbonization 
policies—that is, policies designed to reduce U.S. carbon emissions for the 
 
1. Nathaniel Rich, Losing Earth: The Decade We Almost Stopped Climate Change, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG. (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/08/01/ 
magazine/climate-change-losing-earth.html [https://perma.cc/5F8U-SHK2]. 
2. Id.  When commentators criticize human nature as the root of the climate problem, 
they are typically referring to modern capitalist democracies.  Of course, many cultures, 
present and past, have prioritized future generations in their decisionmaking, belying 
any claims to the “naturalness” of climate inaction.  See, e.g., LINDA CLARKSON ET AL., 
INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO THE SEVENTH GENERATION: 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (1992), 
https://www.iisd.org/pdf/seventh_gen.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DDD-ANYM]; cf. Jedediah 
Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Climate Change, Environmental Law, and Democracy, 119 
YALE L.J. 1122, 1193–94 (2010) (arguing that certain local communities’ adoption of 
comprehensive climate goals undercuts claims about the inevitability of self-interested or 
short-term thinking on the topic).  For present purposes, I use “human nature” as others 
writing in the field have, to refer to modern U.S. psychological and cultural tendencies.  But I 
do so with some doubts as to whether modern U.S. tendencies really reflect human nature or 
instead reflect our particular economic system and cultural moment. 
3. See Stephen M. Gardiner, A Perfect Moral Storm: Climate Change, Intergenerational 
Ethics and the Problem of Moral Corruption, 15 ENVTL. VALUES 397, 397 (2006) (arguing 
that climate change implicates “a set of global, intergenerational and theoretical 
problems” that “justifies calling it a ‘perfect moral storm’”); Robert Gifford, The 
Dragons of Inaction: Psychological Barriers That Limit Climate Change Mitigation and 
Adaptation, 66 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 290 (2011) (similar); Richard J. Lazarus, Super 
Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1160 (2009) (arguing that climate change belongs in the category 
of “super wicked” problems because “the longer it takes to address the problem, the 
harder it will be to do so” and “those who are in the best position to address the 
problem are not only those who caused it, but also those with the least immediate 
incentive to act”); Robert R.M. Verchick, Culture, Cognition, and Climate, 2016 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 969, 975–81 (detailing the cognitive challenges that prevent people from acting 
on climate change). 
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good of the planet.4  To work around these challenges, the Obama 
administration resorted to executive orders and notice-and-comment 
rulemaking as its predominant means of achieving decarbonization 
progress.5  Only a few years later, however, this strategy has proven fleeting, as 
the Trump administration has begun reversing the bulk of these policies.6 
As federal leadership on climate change disintegrates, this Article 
contends that it is time to reexamine the assumption that the people are 
necessarily a barrier to climate progress.  Instead, this Article argues, there are 
underappreciated ways in which well-designed and broad-based citizen input 
and control could be powerful steps in crafting a more durable U.S. 
decarbonization strategy.7  
There are two key components to this argument.  The first is to assert the 
value of more granular thinking around how to involve people in the project 
of decarbonization.  Although often painted as a technocratic endeavor, 
decarbonization is better conceived of as a suite of complex choices about the 
future shape of our communities and economy.8  Broadly speaking, the 
choices involved in this effort can usefully be broken down into three 
interrelated but distinct questions: (1) whether to decarbonize, (2) how fast to 
decarbonize, and (3) how to decarbonize—the technologies and methods of 
decarbonization. 
This Article contends that even if one believes that contemporary U.S. 
human nature is flawed when it comes to climate change, our nature does not 
struggle equally with all three questions.  Questions (1) and (2)—whether and 
how fast to decarbonize—are susceptible to our fallibilities in addressing 
intertemporal and interspatial inequalities.9  In contrast, question (3)—
regarding infrastructure and social structure preferences—is more amenable 
 
4. See infra Subpart I.A for a fuller description of decarbonization and Subparts I.B–I.C 
for more on these democratic challenges. 
5. See infra Subpart I.C. 
6. See infra Subpart II.A. 
7. I use the term “citizen” in this Article not in the narrow legal sense but to refer to 
people living together in a community.  The extent to which citizen participation could 
extend beyond those with legally recognized citizenship will depend upon the 
particulars of any given proposal, but I would encourage the broadest conception of 
citizen possible in effectuating my proposals. 
8. See Roger E. Kasperson & Bonnie J. Ram, The Public Acceptance of New Energy 
Technologies, DÆDALUS, Winter 2013, at 90, 91 (arguing that the energy transition is at 
heart a “social” question); Shelley Welton, Electricity Markets and the Social Project of 
Decarbonization, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1067, 1093–97 (2018) (considering why 
decarbonization is a “social project”). 
9. See infra Subpart I.B. 
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to broad input.10  This question lacks the temporal and other-regarding 
constraints that plague the first two questions, and instead focuses on more 
immediate, practical choices about energy and infrastructure in our 
communities.  For example, would you rather live with an industrial-scale 
wind farm in your sight line, or bear the hidden but potentially catastrophic 
risks of a nuclear plant nearby?  Is it worth paying more to have solar on every 
roof to avoid huge solar arrays and transmission lines taking up open space?  
Should you have to pay extra for your energy if you choose to live in a big 
house with a pool?  Should public money be spent on electric buses or 
subsidies for individual electric vehicles?  These are value-based questions 
that technical expertise can inform but not answer.11 
After developing this disaggregation of the questions involved in 
decarbonization, the Article’s second key assertion is that climate scholars 
have underappreciated how increasing people’s involvement in choices about 
how to decarbonize may advance U.S. efforts to tackle climate change.  In 
fact, focusing first on the third question—that is, simply giving Americans 
more control over their energy system—would likely bring climate progress.12  
There is a fear—grounded largely in the energy industry’s successful climate 
change denial campaign13—that if everyday Americans were given more say 
in how our economy and society are powered, many would choose to run on 
coal.  But research consistently suggests that this outcome is unlikely.  Over 80 
percent of Americans rank increasing renewable energy as a top energy 
priority.14  It seems, then, that Americans want a clean energy system but live 
 
10. See infra Subpart II.B. 
11. See infra Part III; see also Sheila Jasanoff, Just Transitions: A Humble Approach to 
Global Energy Futures, 35 ENERGY RES. & SOC. SCI. 11, 13 (2018) (“Policymakers need to 
understand, as Pope Francis suggested in his climate encyclical of 2015, that looking to 
science is not equivalent to finding ethical solutions.”). 
12. See generally STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & DAVID M. KONISKY, CHEAP AND CLEAN: HOW 
AMERICANS THINK ABOUT ENERGY IN THE AGE OF GLOBAL WARMING (2014) (documenting 
Americans’ widespread preference for clean energy across political parties and geographies). 
13. See ANTHONY LEISEROWITZ ET AL., YALE PROGRAM ON CLIMATE CHANGE COMMC’N & GEO. 
MASON UNIV. CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE COMMC’N, POLITICS & GLOBAL WARMING: APRIL 2019, 
at 4 (2018) (finding that 41 percent of U.S. registered voters do not believe that global warming 
is caused mostly by human activities), https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2019/05/Politics-Global-Warming-April-2019b.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D8GT-AXMA]; see also infra Subpart I.C. 
14. CARY FUNK & BRIAN KENNEDY, PEW RESEARCH CTR., PUBLIC DIVIDES OVER ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION AND ENERGY POLICY 3 (2017), https://www.pewinternet.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/9/2017/05/PS_2017.05.16_Energy-Priorities_FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HV9A-F2BQ]; see also Michael Greenberg, Energy Sources, Public Policy, 
and Public Preferences: Analysis of US National and Site-Specific Data, 37 ENERGY POL’Y 
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in a democracy that has failed to deliver it to them.15  Americans also appear 
to value the ability to choose the technologies and strategies that are used to 
respond to climate change rather than have them dictated to them.16  For 
these reasons, incorporating more citizen input and control into our 
decarbonization methods might prove a vital element of advancing the aim of 
an eventual federal decarbonization mandate.17 
After making the case for greater citizen control of the choices 
surrounding how we decarbonize, the Article considers how to practically 
accomplish such a thing.  Focusing on energy law and the energy sector, 
which will bear the brunt of necessary changes,18 it argues for a more 
capacious understanding of citizen engagement than is typically 
contemplated in administrative law.19  Given the entrenched power of the 
energy industry,20 reforms must go beyond expanding the numbers and 
locales of public hearings or striving for widespread participation in classical 
notice-and-comment rulemaking, toward creating institutional structures in 
which more successful and impactful citizen participation can occur.  
Reforms must also go beyond consumer choice and corporate purchasing 
initiatives, which do nothing to foster a sense of greater collective control over 
the shape of our future lower-carbon society.21 
 
3242, 3242 (2009) (finding over 90 percent support for greater reliance on solar and 
wind in a broad U.S. survey). 
15. See infra Subparts II.B–II.C. 
16. See infra Subpart II.C; cf. Dan M. Kahan et al., Geoengineering and Climate Change 
Polarization: Testing a Two-Channel Model of Science Communication, 658 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 192, 192 (2015) [hereinafter Kahan et al., Geoengineering] 
(finding that knowledge about the broad range of solutions to climate change increases 
worry about the problem itself). 
17. See infra Part III; see also Eric Biber, Cultivating a Green Political Landscape: Lessons for 
Climate Change Policy From the Defeat of California’s Proposition 23, 66 VAND. L. REV. 
399, 402 (2013) (documenting how intermediate steps can foster supportive interest 
groups, which help build coalitions that advance ever-tougher climate policies); Jonas 
Meckling et al., Winning Coalitions for Climate Policy: Green Industrial Policy Builds 
Support for Carbon Regulation, 349 SCI. 1170 (2015). 
18. See infra Subpart II.A. 
19. Cf. David Arkush, Democracy and Administrative Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
611 (2012) (examining how to increase citizen participation within existing 
administrative constructs); Reeve T. Bull, Making the Administrative State “Safe for 
Democracy”: A Theoretical and Practical Analysis of Citizen Participation in Agency 
Decisionmaking, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 611, 617, 622 (2013) (similar); Mariano-Florentino 
Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 470 (2005) (similar). 
20. See infra Subpart I.C. 
21. See Shelley Welton, Grasping for Energy Democracy, 116 MICH. L. REV. 581 (2018) 
(exploring three different emerging conceptions of “energy democracy” and critiquing 
the consumerist version); see also infra Part II. 
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The Article proposes two concrete, complementary reforms that could 
engender meaningful citizen participation in decarbonization policy.  First, 
states could harness the power of public utility law to require utilities to gauge 
and report to regulators on their customers’ energy resource preferences as 
part of utilities’ mandatory long-term planning.  Through this requirement, 
utilities and their regulators would gain a better understanding of what 
consumers want out of their energy system, and participants might feel like 
more than just ratepayers stuck with the bill for whatever infrastructure 
decisions their utility makes on their behalf. 
This reform alone would be unlikely to shift utility behavior dramatically 
since these companies are state-sanctioned monopoly corporations with captive 
customer bases.22  To make utilities respond, customers need structural, collective 
alternatives to utility service to which they can turn if their utility proves 
indifferent to their demands.23  Accordingly, the Article also celebrates—at least 
as worthy experiments—emerging amendments to state laws that allow 
communities to assume more direct control over their energy supply.24 
In making the case for more citizen involvement in decarbonization, this 
Article draws from and contributes to several strands of literature.  Jedediah 
Purdy has provided the most poignant pushback against the accepted 
incompatibility of climate change and democratic politics, tracing the ways in 
which the collective meaning of environmentalism has shifted over time 
through American democratic politics and arguing that American values on 
climate change are similarly mutable.25  But Purdy acknowledges that the goal 
of changing American values about climate change feels “utopian, in the 
pejorative sense,” in the present moment.26  This Article articulates concrete 
strategies for engaging people more in the fight against climate change to help 
shift the project from the realm of utopian possibility into legal reform efforts. 
This Article also builds upon the literature on how to frame and 
communicate climate change to persuade a broader swath of Americans to 
care.27  Prior research on these questions illuminates which messages might 
 
22. See William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1614, 
1638–43 (2014) (explaining the conceptual origins of “public utility”). 
23. Cf. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 4 (1970) (explaining how “voice” and “exit” are 
complementary strategies in organizational dynamics, because increased ease of exit 
enhances the power of internal protests to force organizational change). 
24. See infra Subparts III.B–C. 
25. Purdy, supra note 2, at 1125. 
26. JEDEDIAH PURDY, AFTER NATURE: A POLITICS FOR THE ANTHROPOCENE 269 (2015). 
27. See Dan M. Kahan et al., Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus, 14 J. RISK RES. 147 
(2011); Dan Kahan, Fixing the Communications Failure, 463 NATURE 296 (2010) [hereinafter 
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help more Americans accept the challenge of climate change—but often with 
limited discussion of the institutional mechanisms that will allow this 
acceptance to translate into better policy outcomes.28  Indeed, given 
widespread agreement among Americans that increasing investments in 
renewable energy should be a policy priority,29 framing may not be the key to 
decarbonizing energy.  What is lacking is the structural control to translate 
our values into policy outcomes.30 
Of course, shifting structural control of the economic and political system 
takes time.  All the while, climate change is accelerating.31  These dynamics stoke 
a fear that there may not be time to avert dangerous or catastrophic warming by 
working through state and local channels to build more durable, widespread 
support for federal climate action.32  Emerging research suggests that even two 
degrees Celsius of warming may be enough to send the earth past a tipping point, 
past which runaway warming becomes difficult to reverse.33 
The risk that citizen empowerment will yield too little, too late is both real 
and unavoidable.  We know, scientifically, what decarbonization will take.34  But 
our politics and our institutions are failing us—and must become the focus of 
reform.  This Article’s focus on institutional structures situates it within a 
 
Kahan, Fixing Failure]; Hari M. Osofsky & Jacqueline Peel, Energy Partisanship, 65 EMORY 
L.J. 695, 697–98 (2016); Edward L. Rubin, Rejecting Climate Change: Not Science Denial, But 
Regulation Phobia, 32 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 103 (2016); Per Espen Stoknes, Rethinking 
Climate Communications and the “Psychological Climate Paradox,” 1 ENERGY RES. & SOC. 
SCI. 161 (2014); Verchick, supra note 3. 
28. See sources cited supra note 27. 
29. See ANSOLABEHERE & KONISKY, supra note 12; FUNK & KENNEDY, supra note 14; 
Greenberg, supra note 14. 
30. Cf. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 745 (Arthur 
Goldhammer trans., 2014) (“If democracy is someday to regain control of capitalism, it 
must start by recognizing that the concrete institutions in which democracy and 
capitalism are embodied need to be reinvented again and again.”); K. SABEEL RAHMAN, 
DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION 3 (2017). 
31. See MYLES ALLEN ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL 
WARMING OF 1.5°C: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 4 (2018), https://www.ipcc.ch/ 
site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/05/SR15_SPM_version_report_LR.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q7C8-EEBW]. 
32. See, e.g., GEOFF MANN & JOEL WAINWRIGHT, CLIMATE LEVIATHAN: A POLITICAL THEORY OF 
OUR PLANETARY FUTURE 39 (2018) (“If climate science is even half-right in its forecasts, the 
liberal model of democracy is at best too slow, at worst a devastating distraction.”). 
33. See Will Steffen et al., Trajectories of the Earth System in the Anthropocene, 115 PROC. 
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8252, 8256 (2018). 
34. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 31, at 12 (describing modeled pathways to “limit global warming 
to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot,” which “can involve different portfolios of mitigation 
measures, striking different balances between lowering energy and resource intensity, rate of 
decarbonization, and the reliance on carbon dioxide removal”). 
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growing conversation about the political economy of decarbonization,35 which is 
the critical frontier of climate law scholarship.  The key challenge for climate change 
law scholars is no longer devising theoretically sound legal strategies for guiding the 
clean energy transition.  Instead, it is time to confront the raw political struggle that 
has prevented numerous ideas from gaining traction for forty years.36  The Article 
contributes to this endeavor by interrogating how more citizen involvement may 
advance the goal of substantial society-wide decarbonization. 
This Article proceeds in three Parts.  Part I lays out my exposition of the 
democratic challenges confronting decarbonization policies and traces how 
these challenges have shunted policymakers away from seeking widespread 
public engagement.  Part II develops my theory that decisionmaking around 
decarbonization can be usefully disaggregated into three distinct questions, 
which do not all equally confront cognitive and cultural challenges.  It then 
considers how this disaggregation could advance U.S. efforts to stem the tide 
of climate change.  Finally, Part III sets forth my suggestions as to how energy 
governance could be reformed to better respond to citizens’ and 
communities’ energy preferences and values. 
I. CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE “DOUBLE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT” 
[T]he heart of the problem is that climate change has many of the 
properties of being the world’s largest collective action problem, and it 
is difficult for any country that is responsive to its citizens to do its fair 
share in securing the global public good of climate stability.37 
Over the forty-year history of efforts to respond to climate change, 
numerous scholars have examined why it has proven so difficult to craft an 
adequate, comprehensive solution.  Some make claims that relate to the 
structure of human reasoning and democratic societies in general.38  Others 
 
35. See Biber, supra note 17; Eric Biber et al., The Political Economy of Decarbonization: A 
Research Agenda, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 605 (2017); see also MICHAEL P. VANDENBERGH & 
JONATHAN M. GILLIGAN, BEYOND POLITICS: THE PRIVATE GOVERNANCE RESPONSE TO 
CLIMATE CHANGE (2017) (looking for politically viable workarounds through private 
governance); David E. Adelman & David B. Spence, Ideology vs. Interest Group Politics 
in U.S. Energy Policy, 95 N.C. L. REV. 339 (2017); William W. Buzbee, Federalism 
Hedging, Entrenchment, and the Climate Challenge, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 1037, 1044, 1053–54 
(arguing for the importance of state and local climate action as a “hedging” strategy to build 
stakeholder and coalition support for a federal regime). 
36. The first congressional hearing on climate change took place on April 3, 1980.  See 
Rich, supra note 1. 
37. DALE JAMIESON, REASON IN A DARK TIME: WHY THE STRUGGLE AGAINST CLIMATE 
CHANGE FAILED—AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR OUR FUTURE 99 (2014). 
38. See infra notes 68–90. 
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illuminate why the challenge of responding to climate change has proven 
acute in the United States in recent decades.39  My aim in this Part is to 
synopsize the many components of this argument.  In brief, I argue that 
existing research points to a “double democratic deficit” when it comes to 
climate change in the United States.  First, as many scholars have explored, 
efforts to decarbonize are challenging even within an ideal democracy 
because our minds, culture, and political institutions are poorly equipped to 
deal with such an expansive, creeping problem.  Second, critics from all 
political valences agree that democracy in the United States is far from ideal at 
the present moment—and it is broken in ways that can make efforts to 
empower citizens to combat climate change appear foolhardy. 
A. Some Terminological Preliminaries 
This Article argues for greater citizen engagement and empowerment in 
the project of decarbonizing the U.S. energy system.  Before plunging in any 
further, it may be helpful to specify what I mean by these terms.  The idea of 
engaging and empowering citizens to make choices about their energy future is 
often subsumed into the emerging buzz phrase “energy democracy.”  
Proponents of energy democracy generally argue for more citizen control 
over the energy system through a divergent set of reforms that variously 
include consumer purchasing initiatives, localism, changing ownership 
structures, and more participatory governance.40  To avoid the vagueness that 
accompanies an undifferentiated call for energy democracy, I speak 
specifically in terms of citizen engagement and citizen empowerment. 
I use the term “citizen engagement” to describe efforts to solicit greater 
citizen input and involvement in the project of government, without giving 
citizens reins over final outcomes.41  The theory driving these reforms is that 
 
39. See infra notes 107–111. 
40. See Denise Fairchild & Al Weinrub, Introduction, in ENERGY DEMOCRACY: ADVANCING 
EQUITY IN CLEAN ENERGY SOLUTIONS 1, 13 (Denise Fairchild & Al Weinrub eds., 2017) 
(“[Energy democracy] initiatives focus on community control of, access to, and 
ownership of energy assets.”); CRAIG MORRIS & ARNE JUNGJOHANN, ENERGY 
DEMOCRACY: GERMANY’S ENERGIEWENDE TO RENEWABLES, at vii (2016) (defining 
“energy democracy” as “when citizens and communities can make their own energy, 
even when it hurts energy corporations financially”); Welton, supra note 21 (exploring 
three different emerging conceptions of “energy democracy”). 
41. Proposals aimed at citizen engagement often employ the terminologies administrative 
democracy, new governance, and—in at least some of its forms—deliberative 
democracy.  See Arkush, supra note 19; Bull, supra note 19; Cuéllar, supra note 19; see 
also James S. Fishkin, The Televised Deliberative Poll: An Experiment in Democracy, 546 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 132, 140 (1996) (championing deliberative polling 
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citizens have valuable information to offer decisionmakers regarding priorities, 
strategies, and desired outcomes—such that well-constructed means of 
participation should enhance both the quality of decisions and citizens’ 
satisfaction with the decisionmaking process.42 
These methods of citizen engagement contrast with reforms aimed at 
what I call “citizen empowerment.”43  Citizen empowerment seeks to enhance 
citizens’ direct control over outcomes rather than just giving them more of a 
say in a technocrat-controlled process.  Advocates for citizen empowerment 
thus argue for “devolving decision making or administrative power to venues 
that are directly accessible to citizens.”44  Such reforms might include modes 
of direct democracy like referenda and recalls45 or localist reforms that 
devolve authority to governmental units that operate “closer to the people.”46 
 
as a way to obtain high-quality citizen engagement); Jody Freeman, Collaborative 
Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4, 6 (1997) (offering a 
“normative vision of collaborative governance,” id. at 4 (emphasis omitted) in which 
“parties share responsibility for all stages of the rule-making process,” id. at 6); Orly 
Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in 
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 345 (2004) (proposing an agency 
governance model that “promotes a movement downward and outward, transferring 
responsibilities to states, localities, and the private sector—including private businesses and 
nonprofit organizations”). 
42. See Arkush, supra note 19; Cuéllar, supra note 19; Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, 
A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 283 (1998) 
(proposing a new model of “institutionalized democratic deliberation”); Cynthia R. 
Farina et al., Rulemaking vs. Democracy: Judging and Nudging Public Participation That 
Counts, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 123, 124 (2012) (arguing that successful “civic 
engagement systems” within rulemakings “must involve a purposeful and continuous 
effort to balance ‘more’ and ‘better’ participation”). 
43. Cf. Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 729 (2001) 
(contrasting proponents of “participatory democracy” with those who “seek ways of 
improving the representative, administrative government we actually possess”). 
44. Archon Fung, Associations and Democracy: Between Theories, Hopes, and Realities, 29 
ANN. REV. SOC. 515, 531 (2003) (describing a strong version of associative democracy in 
these terms); see, e.g., BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY 
POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 132 (2003) (defining “strong democracy” as a “participatory 
process of ongoing, proximate self-legislation” (emphasis omitted)); Archon Fung & 
Erik Olin Wright, Deepening Democracy: Innovations in Empowered Participatory 
Governance, 29 POL. & SOC’Y 5, 7 (2001) (describing a family of reforms they call 
“Empowered Deliberative Democracy” (emphasis omitted)); Ethan J. Leib & 
Christopher S. Elmendorf, Why Party Democrats Need Popular Democracy and Popular 
Democrats Need Parties, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 69, 70 (2012) (describing “popular 
democracy” as including “initiatives, referenda, and more innovative forays in 
participatory democracy”). 
45. Direct democracy’s democratic pedigree has been called into question by many.  See, 
e.g., THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, 
AND RECALL (1999); JOHN G. MATSUSAKA, FOR THE MANY OR THE FEW: THE INITIATIVE, 
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There is considerable debate among democratic theorists as to whether 
one of these modes of citizen involvement is superior to the other.  Critics of 
citizen engagement accuse it of being too anemic a form of participation;47 
critics of citizen empowerment suggest it is too trusting of the capacities of 
nonexperts.48  I do not intend to settle this debate here, as I think both 
theories of reform can be useful in energy governance.49  In fact, I contend 
that the best strategies will involve complementary pursuits of citizen 
engagement and empowerment.50 
Finally, a word about the other term central to this Article, 
“decarbonization.”  By now, most people are familiar with the problem of 
climate change and the ways in which human-created greenhouse gas 
emissions are contributing to a gradual warming of the earth’s temperature 
with dire geophysical, economic, and social consequences.51  There are, 
basically, three ways the world can respond: mitigate, adapt, or suffer.52  
 
PUBLIC POLICY, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2004).  Because I do not advocate for 
classic direct democracy like referenda in this Article, I set this debate aside. 
46. See CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 42 (1970) (arguing 
that “for maximum participation by all the people . . . democracy must take place” 
beyond “representative institutions at [the] national level” in order to create capable 
citizens); Kathryn Abrams, Law’s Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1591, 1605 (1988) 
(arguing for the superiority of localities as sites for citizen participation); Robert A. 
Dahl, The City in the Future of Democracy, 61 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 953, 954 (1967); 
Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1061 (1980) 
(advocating for “city power” on democratic justifications). 
47. See David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1766, 1770 
(2005) (contrasting a “radical” form of participatory democracy focused on 
dramatically rethinking how people participate in making the decisions that govern 
their lives with a “mainstream” version focused on tweaking existing processes, id. at 1770, and 
observing that “participation in government can be pacifying,” id. at 1766). 
48. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 261–62 (1942) for 
a classic critique.  For a contemporary polemic against citizens’ democratic capabilities, 
see JASON BRENNAN, AGAINST DEMOCRACY (2016). 
49. See Daniel J. Fiorino, Environmental Risk and Democratic Process: A Critical Review, 14 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 501, 535 (1989) (observing that “modern participation theorists 
recognize the implausibility of pure democracy, and they look to institutional forms 
that can be adapted to the demands of a modern state”); Archon Fung, Varieties of 
Participation in Complex Governance, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 66, 66 (2006) 
(“[T]here is no canonical form of direct participation in modern democratic governance; 
modes of contemporary participation are, and should be, legion.”). 
50. See infra Part III. 
51. See 2 U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RES. PROGRAM, FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT: 
IMPACTS, RISKS, AND ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED STATES (David R. Reidmiller et al. eds., 
2018), https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/downloads/NCA4_2018_FullReport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KEF7-LJEW]. 
52. See WAINWRIGHT & MANN, supra note 32, at 60 n.18 (attributing this formulation to 
John P. Holdren, former climate advisor to President Barack Obama). 
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Mitigation refers to actions to stem the pace of climate change—including, 
most critically, decarbonization.53  Decarbonization is the process of 
eliminating fossil fuel–powered activities and technologies that contribute carbon 
to the atmosphere and thereby induce climate change54 or enhancing activities 
that remove carbon from the atmosphere (such as planting forests).55  The 
second option, adaptation, refers to adjustments in our modes of living to cope 
with a hotter, more unpredictable planet.56  The third option, suffering, should be 
all too self-explanatory—although such suffering will not be distributed evenly 
across the planet.57  Realistically, the world is likely to pursue or endure some 
combination of these three outcomes.  But their interrelationship is clear: More 
decarbonization yields less need for adaptation and helps prevent suffering, 
particularly among the most vulnerable—such that many consider it an “ethical 
and planetary imperative.”58 
In 2015, international negotiators achieved a landmark climate accord, 
the Paris Agreement, which sets a goal of limiting planetary warming to “well 
 
53. Id. at 59; see also John C. Dernbach, Introduction, in LEGAL PATHWAYS TO DEEP 
DECARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (Michael B. Gerrard & John C. Dernbach 
eds., 2019) (sketching a “playbook of legal pathways” to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas 
emissions).  While carbon dioxide is the main driver of climate change, as Dernbach 
observes, “[a]ny comprehensive effort to address climate pollutants must also address 
methane, nitrous oxide, fluorinated gases, and black carbon.”  Id. at 3.  These additional 
greenhouse gases are sidelined in my analysis here; for more on their reduction, see 
Emily Baer, Pulling the Second Lever: Regulating Black Carbon to Combat Global 
Warming, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. 11,034 (2016) (examining the role of black carbon, a 
component of soot, in climate change); Jonathan Lovvorn, Climate Change Beyond 
Environmentalism Part II: Near-Term Climate Mitigation in a Post-Regulatory Era, 30 
GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 211–22 (2018) (examining the importance of reducing methane 
emissions “as a near-term mitigation strategy,” id. at 211). 
54. “Eliminating” in this context might refer to replacing fossil fuels with another energy source 
or to capturing fossil fuel emissions to prevent their escape to the atmosphere through a 
process known as “carbon capture and storage.”  See, e.g., DEEPIKA NAGABHUSHAN & JOHN 
THOMPSON, CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE, CARBON CAPTURE & STORAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 
POWER SECTOR: THE IMPACT OF 45Q FEDERAL TAX CREDITS 4 (2019), https://www.catf.us/wp-
content/uploads/2019/02/CATF_CCS_United_States_Power_Sector.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
32AG-GLJ5]. 
55. Dernbach, supra note 53. 
56. Verchick, supra note 3, at 972. 
57. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. FIELD ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY: SUMMARY 
FOR POLICYMAKERS 6 (2014), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/ 
2018/02/ar5_wgII_spm_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/FSN5-3HZM] (charting differences in 
vulnerability based on climactic and nonclimactic factors, and observing that “[p]eople who 
are socially, economically, culturally, politically, institutionally, or otherwise marginalized 
are especially vulnerable to climate change and also to some adaptation and mitigation 
responses”). 
58. WAINWRIGHT & MANN, supra note 32, at 61. 
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below 2°C above pre-industrial levels.”59  Experts widely agree that 
achievement of the 2°C goal will require reaching 80 percent fewer carbon 
emissions in the United States by 2050 and negative carbon emissions by 2100—a 
level of decarbonization often referred to as “deep decarbonization.”60 
Given how thoroughly fossil fuels permeate the U.S. economy, we will need 
a broad and deep transformation of the ways in which we live, work, travel, and 
play to reach these targets.  Transportation and electricity generation each 
account for around 28 percent of U.S. carbon emissions today, together 
composing roughly 56 percent of total U.S. emissions.61  Industry, agriculture, 
and direct commercial and residential consumption make up the rest (at 
22 percent, 9 percent, and 12 percent, respectively).62  To reach deep 
decarbonization, it is likely that the transportation sector and commercial and 
residential heating will need to almost entirely electrify—at the same time that the 
electricity sector switches to carbon-free generation sources and doubles in size.63  
This dramatic shift would eliminate over 60 percent of U.S. emissions, which is 
why the electricity sector is a critical focus for decarbonization policy generally 
and for this Article in particular.64 
That said, the tentacles of decarbonization will need to reach beyond the 
energy sector to achieve the necessary targets.  Attention must also be paid to 
 
59. Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104.  Science increasingly suggests that 1.5 Celsius 
would better protect against “dangerous anthropogenic interference.”  Dernbach, supra 
note 53, at 4; see also ALLEN ET AL., supra note 31, at 7–11 (charting the differences 
between 1.5 Celsius and 2 Celsius of warming). 
60. See THE WHITE HOUSE, UNITED STATES MID-CENTURY STRATEGY FOR DEEP 
DECARBONIZATION 6–7 (2016), https://unfccc.int/files/focus/long-term_strategies/ 
application/pdf/mid_century_strategy_report-final_red.pdf [https://perma.cc/24WZ-
4DWW]; 2 JAMES H. WILLIAMS ET AL., SUSTAINABLE DEV. SOLUTIONS NETWORK, POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS OF DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2015), 
http://usddpp.org/downloads/2015-report-on-policy-implications.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
HB44-F9NB]; Dernbach, supra note 53; James Hansen et al., Young People’s Burden: 
Requirement of Negative CO2 Emissions, 8 EARTH SYS. DYNAMICS 577, 590 (2017). 
61. See Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions [https://perma.cc/ 
7FXX-Y4YQ] (last updated Apr. 11, 2020) [hereinafter Sources of GHGs]. 
62. Id. 
63. See Dernbach, supra note 53, at 8 (noting that the leading analyses agree that deep 
decarbonization will require all sectors to switch “from fossil fuel use to decarbonized 
energy carriers, principally electricity”). 
64. See James H. Williams et al., The Technology Path to Deep Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Cuts by 2050: The Pivotal Role of Electricity, 335 SCI. 53, 54 (2012)  (finding through 
modeling that to reach deep decarbonization in California, “there was no alternative to 
widespread switching of direct fuel uses (e.g., gasoline in cars) to electricity in order to 
achieve the reduction target”). 
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ways of shifting transportation modalities toward electricity, transforming 
industrial and manufacturing processes, better managing soil and agricultural 
waste, and rethinking land use and development patterns.65  When thinking 
about the role of the citizenry in decarbonization, each of these sectors requires a 
different analysis.  Citizen input is likely less useful in, say, reducing emissions 
from cement manufacturing than it might be in changing land use patterns.66  In 
focusing on the energy sector, I necessarily leave aside this comparative analysis 
and thus neglect some elements of a full decarbonization agenda.  I leave for 
others, hopefully moved by my analysis, the question of whether more citizen 
engagement and empowerment might also enhance the decarbonization of 
other sectors. 
B. The Fallibility of Citizens, Society, and Political Institutions 
You most likely contributed to the problem of climate change in the amount 
of time it took you to read this sentence—at least, you did if you exhaled.  You 
contributed considerably more if you turned on lights when you woke up this 
morning, ate breakfast, or drove to work.  Yet it is hard to feel guilty for 
undertaking these daily tasks.67  The difficulty of moralizing greenhouse gas 
emissions presents the first challenge to an adequate response to the problem: 
Each of us contributes in such miniscule, accretive ways that it is difficult to 
conceptualize exactly what we are doing wrong that needs to change.68 
 
65. See, e.g., Vicki Arroyo et al., New Strategies for Reducing Transportation Emissions and 
Preparing for Climate Impacts, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 919, 920 (2017).  In 2018, U.S. 
forests and managed lands absorbed around 11 percent of our national greenhouse gas 
emissions.  See Sources of GHGs, supra note 61 (follow “Land Use/Forestry” hyperlink 
under page title). 
66. See David Markell, Climate Change and the Roles of Land Use and Energy Law: An 
Introduction, 27 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 231, 233–34 (2012) (observing the 
importance of “land use legal regimes” in tackling decarbonization); Controlling 
Industrial Greenhouse Gas Emissions, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS, 
https://www.c2es.org/content/regulating-industrial-sector-carbon-emissions 
[https://perma.cc/43JJ-WFSF] (noting that industrial emissions account for one-fifth of U.S. 
greenhouse gas emissions, and describing potential reduction strategies). 
67. See PURDY, supra note 26, at 250–51; Katrina Fischer Kuh, Capturing Individual Harms, 
35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 155, 156 (2011) (noting that these behaviors are legally and 
socially sanctioned). 
68. See JAMIESON, supra note 37, at 150.  Of course, many corporations have caused 
emissions that contribute to the problem in far from miniscule ways—a fact that is 
intimately linked to the climate denial campaigns discussed infra Subpart II.C.  See, e.g., 
Complaint at 3, City of Santa Cruz v. Chevron Corp., No. 17CV03243 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Dec. 20, 2017) (alleging that named fossil fuel defendants were “directly responsible for 
215.9 gigatons of CO2 emissions between 1965 and 2015, representing 17.5% of total emissions 
of that potent greenhouse gas during that period”). 
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Nevertheless, it is clear at this point that the rational thing to do is to 
change, and change dramatically.  Even if we struggle to see our individual 
contributions as moral wrongs, we still could take steps to alleviate our 
collective harm—but we largely do not.  Many have suggested that the 
reasons why lie in the fallibilities of our minds, our communities, and our 
political systems. 
Psychology contributes greatly to our understanding of how individuals 
process climate change, and several legal scholars have already collected this 
evidence.69  In short, as Rob Verchick argues, the key problem facing climate 
change is that “we don’t care enough.”70  Stated more technically, there are 
numerous cognitive heuristics and biases that make it difficult for the human 
mind to adequately process and respond to climate change.71  Climate change 
is a problem with bedeviling links between causation and harm: Many of 
those countries that historically have created the greatest amount of carbon 
emissions will suffer the fewest consequences of its effects.72  Moreover, 
although people across the globe have experienced some negative effects from 
climate change, future generations will bear the brunt of the consequences.73  
These characteristics of climate change make it what Richard Lazarus has 
called a “super wicked problem.”74 
Many behavioral economists have demonstrated why our brains may be 
particularly poor at processing precisely this type of challenge.  We operate 
under “bounded rationality,” influenced by our “limited computational skills 
and seriously flawed memories.”75  A number of common cognitive errors are 
at work with respect to climate change.  The availability heuristic posits that 
 
69. See Lazarus, supra note 3, at 1173–79; Purdy, supra note 2, at 1132–35; Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, The Psychology of Global Climate Change, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 299; Carol M. 
Rose, Commons, Cognition, and Climate Change, 32 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 297, 301–
12 (2017); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and 
Climate Change, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 503 (2007); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically 
Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 253–56 (2000); 
Verchick, supra note 3. 
70. Verchick, supra note 3, at 973 (emphasis omitted). 
71. See supra note 2 for caveats to the breadth of these claims.  On heuristics and biases in 
general, the pathbreaking work of Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman is of central 
importance.  See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974). 
72. See Lazarus, supra note 3, at 1170–73. 
73. Jedediah Purdy argues that this temporal challenge is more difficult than the 
geographical one.  PURDY, supra note 26, at 247. 
74. Lazarus, supra note 3, at 1160. 
75. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1471, 1477 (1998). 
72 67 UCLA L. REV. 56 (2020) 
people worry most about risks they can readily conjure to mind.76  But the 
slow creep of climate change—as well as the challenge of directly attributing 
any particular catastrophe directly to increased emissions77—makes it hard to 
visualize the danger.78  The optimistic bias compounds this underestimation 
of climate change’s risks because “people tend to show an unrealistic belief in 
their own immunity from certain risks . . . [that] will not be faced until the 
distant future.”79  In particular, humans “extravagantly discount” future 
consequences of present behaviors that will not occur for generations.80 
Moreover, people particularly hate changes that require them not to 
simply forgo gains but to actively give up something, such as the lifestyles 
enabled by fossil fuel consumption.81  And the list of cognitive failings goes 
on—Carol Rose recently added to this stewpot the challenges of “distrust, 
ignorance and insouciance,” which are acute in the climate context because 
cooperation is needed on a massive scale.82 
Researchers have suggested that these cognitive limitations collectively 
create a “massive social trap” on climate change by making each of us 
predisposed to underrespond to the problem.83  But the story is worse than 
these cognitive limitations alone.  Dan Kahan and colleagues have 
persuasively documented how “cultural cognition” causes people to process 
information about climate change on the basis of how it aligns, or misaligns, 
 
76. Sunstein, supra note 69, at 534. 
77. See Sophie Marjanac & Lindene Patton, Extreme Weather Event Attribution Science and 
Climate Change Litigation: An Essential Step in the Causal Chain?, 36 J. ENERGY & NAT. 
RESOURCES L. 265 (2018) (explaining the advancing science of linking particular 
weather events to climate change). 
78. Sunstein, supra note 69, at 523, 534–35, 539–40; see also Lazarus, supra note 3, at 1177 
(arguing that people’s “weak intuitive understanding” of the mechanisms of 
atmospheric gas concentration contributes to this challenge). 
79. Sunstein, supra note 69, at 545 (footnote omitted); see also Jolls et al., supra note 75, at 
1479 (describing the related phenomenon of “bounded willpower,” whereby “human 
beings often take actions that they know to be in conflict with their own long-term 
interests”); Thompson, supra note 69, at 263 (describing experiments that show that 
people “willingly gambl[e] on the future, where the risk is characterized by significant 
uncertainty and avoiding the risk would require giving up something today”). 
80. Thompson, supra note 69, at 262. 
81. Rachlinski, supra note 69, at 308 (describing loss aversion and the status quo bias); see 
also Lazarus, supra note 3, at 1175 (explaining why this dynamic makes reducing 
consumption “especially difficult to accomplish”). 
82. Rose, supra note 69, at 299 (arguing that “[t]hese impediments are in a sense prior to 
cognitive issues” because they “can stop people from even getting to any evidence about 
commons problems, or can cause despair at the very outset about arriving at any solution”). 
83. Rachlinski, supra note 69, at 300. 
Decarbonization in Democracy 73 
with their worldview.84  In short, cultural cognition research demonstrates 
that for most people, the desire to get along with others in their community 
dictates their stance on climate change, and science and facts have little to do 
with it.85  Although such selective filtering of information may make perfect 
sense on an individual level,86 it can have severe negative consequences for 
policymaking when such filtering moves a polity away from socially beneficial 
outcomes, including responding adequately to climate change.87 
These moral, cognitive, and cultural hurdles to good decisionmaking 
around climate change are compounded in the realm of politics.  In addition 
to falling prey to individual fallibilities, politicians face the pressure of 
reelection cycles, which demand quick results.88  Decarbonization legislation, 
in contrast, “imposes costs on the short term for the realization of benefits 
many decades and sometimes centuries later.”89  Moreover, our fragmented 
 
84. Dan M. Kahan et al., The Polarizing Impact of Science Literacy and Numeracy on Perceived 
Climate Change Risks, 2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 732, 732 (2012) [hereinafter Kahan et al., 
Polarizing Impact]; see also P. Sol Hart & Erik C. Nisbet, Boomerang Effects in Science 
Communication: How Motivated Reasoning and Identity Cues Amplify Opinion Polarization 
About Climate Mitigation Policies, 39 COMM. RES. 701, 715 (2012) (finding that “climate 
change messages, especially those talking about impacts on socially distant groups, are likely 
to amplify polarization about the issue”).  Some scholars include the “cultural cognition” 
challenges described here as one aspect of bounded rationality.  See Sunstein, supra note 69, 
at 548; Cass R. Sunstein, Misfearing: A Reply, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1110, 1117–18 (2006) (“In 
my view, cultural cognition is actually a reflection of bounded rationality and a part of the 
general framework that it offers.”); see also Rachlinski, supra note 69, at 304–07 (discussing 
“biased assimilation”); Rose, supra note 69, at 298–99 (parsing these different ways of 
approaching the issue).  Dan Kahan, in contrast, sees cultural cognition as an alternative 
causal explanation for climate change disbelief—one that disproves the idea that bounded 
rationality is the main challenge.  See Kahan et al., Geoengineering, supra note 16, at 194–95; 
Kahan et al., Polarizing Impact, supra, at 732.  The particulars of this debate do not matter 
for this Article’s purposes. 
85. See Kahan et al., Polarizing Impact, supra note 84, at 734; Kahan, Fixing Failure, supra 
note 27, at 296; Verchick, supra note 3, at 976–77; Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of 
Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1083 
(2006) (book review) [hereinafter Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy] (concluding that 
“culture is prior to facts” (emphasis omitted)). 
86. See Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy, supra note 85, at 1072 (“[I]ndividuals effectively 
conform their beliefs about risk to their visions of an ideal society.”). 
87. Kahan, Fixing Failure, supra note 27, at 296 (“The ability of democratic societies to 
protect the welfare of their citizens depends on finding a way to counteract this culture 
war over empirical data.”); Kahan et al., Polarizing Impact, supra note 84, at 734; cf. 
Verchick, supra note 3, at 989 (explaining why we can be confident that the 
overwhelming scientific consensus favoring action on climate change is not itself just a 
product of cultural bias). 
88. Lazarus, supra note 3, at 1179–80; see also Sunstein, supra note 69, at 531–32 
(contrasting politicians’ high political incentives to prevent terrorist attacks “on [their] 
watch” to their relatively lower incentives to prevent climate change). 
89. Lazarus, supra note 3, at 1157. 
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government system—with authority divided among branches—is designed to 
force incremental government action in ways that misalign with the 
magnitude of the long-term response needed to mitigate climate change.90 
All of these factors have helped scholars explain why it has been difficult 
for the United States to respond adequately to the problem.  For purposes of 
this Article, I accept that these tendencies are real and challenging91—
although I find them to be overemphasized relative to the challenges of 
political and economic power distribution.  And indeed, these cognitive 
limitations appear to be slackening as the toll of climate disasters mounts.  
After 2018 delivered a brutal hurricane season in the East and California fires 
that killed record numbers,92 the cognitive availability of climate change rose, 
since people became less able to delude themselves into believing that climate 
change is a problem of the distant future.93  In coming decades, people’s 
concern about climate change is likely to naturally rise alongside the 
predicted increase in disastrous events.94  The fact that people may be growing 
more rational (that is, appropriately attuned to the dangers) when it comes to 
climate risks only strengthens my arguments in favor of citizen control—
although it is a shame that the toll for enhanced rationality is real human 
suffering and ecological damage. 
 
90. Id. at 1180. 
91. As emphasized supra note 2,  I share the concerns of scholars who think these challenges are 
better explained as the result of our current political and cultural moment rather than 
human nature.  See Purdy, supra note 2.  Nevertheless, since imminent climate reforms must 
work within this moment, I take these constraints as presently accurate. 
92. See Cleve R. Wootson Jr., The Deadliest, Most Destructive Wildfire in California’s 
History Has Finally Been Contained, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2018, 4:22 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2018/11/25/camp-fire-deadliest-wildfire-
californias-history-has-been-contained [https://perma.cc/UG7Z-8YZZ]; Destructive 
2018 Hurricane Season Draws to an End, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (Nov. 
28, 2018), https://www.noaa.gov/media-release/destructive-2018-atlantic-hurricane-
season-draws-to-end [https://perma.cc/C5G3-Y2RT]. 
93. See, e.g., John Schwartz, Global Warming Concerns Rise Among Americans in New Poll, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 22, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/22/climate/americans-global-
warming-poll.html [https://perma.cc/LEW2-F9HH] (“A record number of Americans 
understand that climate change is real, according to a new survey, and they are increasingly 
worried about its effects in their lives today.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). 
94. See 2 U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RES. PROGRAM, supra note 51, at 88–91, 94–98 (describing the dire 
health, economic, and infrastructure impacts of increasing severe weather events). 
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C. The Double Deficit: Decarbonization in Troubled Times 
The challenges detailed above should, theoretically, plague decarbonization 
policy even in the most perfect of democracies.95  But the United States is at 
present far from such an ideal.  Many scholars and commentators have exposed 
critical fissures and flaws in our democracy over the past several years.96  In the 
words of Jedediah Purdy, the result of these flaws is that “[d]emocratic citizens’ 
capacity to rework their own common lives has been hollowed out in overt and 
explicit ways.”97  This Subpart describes in broad brushstrokes two of the most 
prominent forms of this diminishment—political polarization and elite 
domination—and then connects them to the climate change challenge. 
Americans are becoming more extreme in their viewpoints and more 
vociferous in their disdain for the other side.98  At the same time, changes in 
campaign finance laws have allowed shadow parties and major donors to 
drive political agendas,99 and these politically active elites tend to be far more 
 
95. Considerably more comparative work is needed to understand why different democracies 
seem to display these predicted behavioral tendencies to quite different degrees, with some 
countries able to establish much more aggressive climate change targets than others.  
Compare, for example, the description of U.S. climate policies infra Subparts I.D–II.A, with 
those of Denmark, which is “working for a climate-neutral society by 2050, which means 
that Denmark will absorb at least as much greenhouse gas as [it] emit[s].”  DANISH MINISTRY 
OF CLIMATE, ENERGY, & UTILS., TOGETHER FOR A GREENER FUTURE (2018), 
https://en.efkm.dk/media/12351/climate-air-proposal-summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
5U9V-HTQX]. 
96. See sources cited infra notes 98–107. 
97. PURDY, supra note 26, at 257. 
98. See Joseph Fishkin & Heather K. Gerken, The Two Trends That Matter for Party Politics, 89 
N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 32, 33 (2014) (“The divide between the parties in terms of both 
ideology and voting patterns is deeper and clearer than it has been for at least sixty years.”); 
Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy 
in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 273 (2011) (“Over the last generation, American 
democracy has had one defining attribute: extreme partisan polarization.”); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Partyism, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 2.  Or, at least, elite Americans and politicians have 
polarized.  See MORRIS P. FIORINA, HOOVER INST., SER. NO. 2, HAS THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 
POLARIZED? 1, 12 (2016), https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/ 
docs/fiorina_finalfile_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/VSX6-K7DU] (arguing that it is a 
“misperception” that polarization has increased among everyday Americans, id. at 1, and 
attributing this trend only to the “political class” of politicians, donors, and activists, id. at 12). 
99. See Heather K. Gerken, The Real Problem with Citizens United: Campaign Finance, 
Dark Money, and Shadow Parties, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 903, 911 (2014); Samuel 
Issacharoff, Outsourcing Politics: The Hostile Takeover of Our Hollowed-Out 
Political Parties, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 845, 845, 849 (2017) (exploring the trends that 
have led to diminished formal party power); Richard H. Pildes, Romanticizing 
Democracy, Political Fragmentation, and the Decline of American Government, 124 
YALE L.J. 804, 830 (2014) (“Political fragmentation has drained partisan elected 
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partisan than “normal people.”100  In concert, these trends give more power to 
the highly ideological poles of the American political spectrum and create less 
movement toward moderate positions capable of producing successful 
legislation.101  The results are a gridlocked Congress, a disenchanted public, 
and ever more vitriolic battles between hyperpartisan candidates and 
positions that exacerbate the public’s disenchantment.102 
Increasing economic inequality amplifies the challenge of 
hyperpartisanship.  As Thomas Piketty’s work has brought to the fore, inequality 
in the United States (and most other wealthy Western democracies) has 
increased significantly since the 1970s, to the point where the richest Americans 
today are richer than the famed tycoons of the early twentieth century.103  In other 
words, we are in a new Gilded Age. 
Together, these trends produce heightened political responsiveness to the 
few Americans with significant money.104  Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page 
have found that politicians are overwhelmingly responsive to the policy 
 
leaders of much of the power to control, unify, and discipline members of their 
own party.”). 
100. “Normal People” is Morris Fiorina’s term, supra note 98, at 4–5.  Alan Abramowitz 
similarly distinguishes the “engaged public” from the public at large.  ALAN I. 
ABRAMOWITZ, THE DISAPPEARING CENTER: ENGAGED CITIZENS, POLARIZATION, AND 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 4 (2010).  The list of potential causes of this polarization is long 
and disparate, and it includes passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, see Pildes, supra 
note 98, at 274, an increasingly polarized media, see Sunstein, supra note 98, at 12, and 
the growing importance of “dark money” and “shadow parties” in American politics, 
see Fishkin & Gerken, supra note 98, at 35; Gerken, supra note 99, at 905. 
101. See Fishkin & Gerken, supra note 98, at 34 (explaining party leaders’ difficulty in building 
coalitions under these conditions); Issacharoff, supra note 99, at 848 (discussing lack of a 
Congressional leadership structure that can “corral hot-headed members . . . in order to just 
get things done”); Pildes, supra note 99, at 809; Sunstein, supra note 98, at 1. 
102. See ABRAMOWITZ, supra note 100, at 168 (“[P]olls show that many Americans dislike 
the excessive partisanship that has characterized American politics in recent years and 
favor bipartisan compromise.”); Gerken, supra note 99, at 919–22 (on the loss of “party 
faithful”); Sunstein, supra note 98, at 16 (on gridlock); Lee Drutman, How Partisanship 
is Fracturing America [sic] Democracy, and Why We Need More of It 10 (Nov. 7, 
2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (explaining why parties have 
been critical to mobilizing citizens in the past). 
103. PIKETTY, supra note 30, at 19 (“[C]oncentration of income in the first decade of the 
twenty-first century . . . slightly exceeded . . . the level attained in the second decade of 
the previous century.”). 
104. See Gerken, supra note 99, at 922; Ganesh Sitaraman, The Puzzling Absence of Economic 
Power in Constitutional Theory, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1445, 1448 (2016) (collecting this 
evidence).  The interrelationship of these trends is complex and multidirectional.  As K. 
Sabeel Rahman explains, “As greater political power is concentrated in economic and 
financial elites and big business, and as labor unions and other forms of countervailing 
power have been broken, the concentration of political power helps drive widening 
inequality.”  RAHMAN, supra note 30, at 178. 
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preferences of the elite, whereas “the preferences of the vast majority of 
Americans appear to have essentially no impact on which policies the 
government does or doesn’t adopt.”105  Accordingly, it makes sense for most 
Americans to deprioritize political participation,106 as they correctly gauge 
that their investments of time and money will have limited influence on 
policy outcomes. 
The effects of these trends have been pernicious in the realm of climate 
change.  Corporate elites have carefully manipulated the climate change 
conversation to drive a wedge among Americans and prevent politicians 
from responding adequately to the challenge.107  They have done so by 
exploiting many of the cultural and cognitive challenges documented above.  
During the 1990s, a group of fossil fuel–tied industries deceptively called 
the “Global Climate Coalition”—which included oil companies, coal 
companies, and electric utilities—led what the New York Times described as 
“an aggressive lobbying and public relations campaign against the idea that 
emissions of heat-trapping gases could lead to global warming,” even though 
their own scientists internally confirmed these causal pathways.108  Today, 
there are active fraud and tort lawsuits against major oil companies for their 
role in obscuring climate science evidence that cuts against their profit 
 
105. MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL 
POWER IN AMERICA 1 (2012); see also Sitaraman, supra note 104, at 1448 (“In a battery 
of studies over the last decade, political scientists have confirmed populist suspicions 
and demonstrated that economic elites dominate the American political system.”). 
106. See Phil Gregory, Jaded View of U.S. Government Deters Many From Political 
Involvement, Survey Finds, WHYY (July 9, 2015), https://whyy.org/articles/jaded-view-
of-us-government-deters-many-from-political-involvement-survey-finds 
[https://perma.cc/L5EC-GNDL] (reporting survey findings that “54 percent of 
Americans say that they can be more effective in the world around them by getting 
involved in nonpolitical activities” (quoting survey director)). 
107. See generally MICHAEL E. MANN, THE HOCKEY STICK AND THE CLIMATE WARS: 
DISPATCHES FROM THE FRONT LINES (2012) (describing that famed climate scientist’s 
run-ins with the climate denial movement); NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, 
MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A HANDFUL OF SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES 
FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO GLOBAL WARMING (2010) (charting the history of climate 
change denialism). 
108. Andrew C. Revkin, Industry Ignored Its Scientists on Climate, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/24/science/earth/24deny.html [https://perma.cc/ 
ST99-94NE]; see also Sara Jerving et al., What Exxon Knew About the Earth’s Melting Arctic, 
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2015), http://graphics.latimes.com/exxon-arctic [https://perma.cc/Y522-
YTGQ] (exposing Exxon’s inside knowledge of climate change); Neela Banerjee et al., Exxon’s 
Own Research Confirmed Fossil Fuels’ Role in Global Warming Decades Ago, INSIDE CLIMATE 
NEWS (Sept. 16, 2015), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/15092015/Exxons-own-
research-confirmed-fossil-fuels-role-in-global-warming [https://perma.cc/L5UN-
AYD7] (similar). 
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motives.109  But much of the damage has already been done: Through targeted 
campaign contributions aimed at persuadable politicians and persistent public 
messaging falsely casting climate science as uncertain, these companies have 
succeeded in rendering climate change a hyperpartisan issue and engendering 
much of the climate skepticism that now pervades the American populace.110 
The current political climate thus puts U.S. decarbonization policy at a 
double democratic deficit.  Even in the best of times, we all appear 
predisposed to underestimate the severity of the climate change problem and 
reject facts that do not fit our communities’ worldviews.  But to engage 
citizens in decarbonization policy now is doubly difficult: In these times of 
deep polarization and elite domination of politics, corporate spending has 
exploited cognitive weaknesses to split Americans’ beliefs about climate change 
along partisan lines in ways that are severely misaligned with the scale of the 
problem and the necessary response to it.111 
D. The Understandable Fallout: Decarbonization  
Through Workarounds 
In the face of these challenges, the predominant and quite 
understandable conclusion of many is that we should work around people 
and politics to devise rational solutions to climate change.112  Three preferred 
alternative avenues emerge: (1) look to agencies and their expertise as the 
place where reason most often prevails,113 (2) rely on markets to drive 
 
109. E.g. County of Santa Cruz v. Chevron Corp., No. 3:18-CV-00450 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 
2018) (remanded to state court on July 10, 2018); People v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 
452044, 2019 WL 6795771 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 10, 2019). 
110. See Kate Aronoff, What the ‘New York Times’ Climate Blockbuster Missed, NATION 
(Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/new-york-times-climate-
blockbuster-misses [https://perma.cc/9MS3-KPEB] (“[T]o pretend that this massive 
PR campaign by polluting interests has nothing to do with the current impasse we 
face in the US on climate policy is to be naive at best and disingenuous at worst.” 
(quoting climate scientist Michael Mann)). 
111. See ORESKES & CONWAY, supra note 107, at 169–215 (describing industry’s climate science 
denial tactics); Ryan Lizza, As the World Burns, NEW YORKER (Oct. 3, 2010), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/10/11/as-the-world-burns [https://perma.cc/ 
42NA-9MZX] (chronicling the failure of the most significant carbon cap-and-trade bill). 
112. See Osofsky & Peel, supra note 27, at 701–02 (proposing a range of “going around” 
strategies for climate progress); Sunstein, supra note 98, at 2; cf. Pildes, supra note 99, at 
824 (cautioning against “romanticizing a more engaged public as a vehicle that will save 
us from hyperpolarized partisan government”). 
113. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 126 
(2005) (making the case for insulated institutions based on cognitive errors); Gillian E. 
Metzger, Agencies, Polarization, and the States, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1742 (2015) 
(noting that during polarized times, “agencies’ preexisting powers mean that the policy 
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change,114 or (3) downscale ambitions to the state and local level, where at 
least certain pockets of the United States agree enough on climate action to 
make progress.115  This Subpart discusses trends in these three directions. 
The first strategy, agency authority, was on full display in the Obama 
administration as a way to navigate the challenging politics of climate change.116  
The Obama administration’s boldest executive action on climate change was the 
Clean Power Plan, which used a relatively obscure provision of the 1970 Clean 
Air Act117 to craft power plant greenhouse gas emissions limitations.118  Similarly, 
the Obama administration advanced significant improvements in vehicle 
emissions standards through rulemaking.119  These steps—which were 
complemented by many state initiatives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions—
allowed the United States to credibly pledge under the Paris Agreement to cut 
U.S. emissions 26–28 percent below 2005 levels by 2025, even absent any new 
legislative efforts by the U.S. Congress to reduce these emissions.120 
The second celebrated strategy for sidestepping climate politics has been 
to look to markets to drive change, by promoting cost-effective technological 
improvements121 and engaging “companies as crucial partners.”122  Several 
 
gridlock produced by polarization at the political level does not forestall policy 
development altogether”); Sunstein, supra note 98, at 21 (“In many cases, the best 
response to partyism lies in reasonable delegation, and in particular in strengthening 
the hand of technocratic forces within government.”); see also Lazarus, supra note 3, at 
1220 (arguing for embedding a greater role for more “neutral, objective scientific 
expertise” into future climate legislation on these grounds); Osofsky & Peel, supra note 
27, at 696 (endorsing “other branches of the federal government,” such as agencies, as 
more fruitful loci of climate policy). 
114. See sources cited infra notes 121–125. 
115. See sources cited infra notes 126–127. 
116. See Kenneth S. Lowande & Sidney M. Milkis, “We Can’t Wait”: Barack Obama, 
Partisan Polarization and the Administrative Presidency, 12 FORUM 3, 6–8 (2014) 
(documenting President Barack Obama’s robust use of unilateral authority to advance 
climate change initiatives). 
117. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, sec. 4(a), § 111, 84 Stat. 1676, 1683–84. 
118. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) 
[hereinafter Clean Power Plan]; see also Osofsky & Peel, supra note 27, at 702, 774 
(suggesting that this rule was a prime example of “going around” the partisan politics of 
climate change, id. at 702, and noting how contentious it was, id. at 774). 
119. See Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010). 




121. See Rachlinski, supra note 69, at 318; Rose, supra note 69, at 328, 331. 
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scholars argue for building upon momentum in the corporate sector for 
certain public-facing companies to brand themselves as responsible 
environmental stewards.  Already, many such corporations—including 
Google, Amazon, and Walmart—have adopted clean energy goals and put 
pressure on suppliers and utilities to change their investments and practices 
to help meet these goals.123  Michael Vandenbergh and Jonathan Gilligan 
argue that in a time of partisan gridlock, these strategies form an important 
stopgap measure to buy time on climate mitigation.124  Jeff Rachlinski makes a 
related argument that the best way around partisan gridlock will simply be to 
make renewable energy so cheap that the market will have no choice but to 
move toward decarbonization.125 
A final predominant strategy for moving forward on decarbonization 
has been to look to cities and certain states as leaders on climate action, 
particularly in the face of federal retreat.126  Numerous cities and states are 
continuing aggressive climate action, with a leading group launching the We 
Are Still In movement in 2017, which pledges to achieve international climate 
commitments even in the absence of national support.127 
It is less clear whether this strategy of downscaling should also be labeled 
a workaround of climate politics—but let me make the case as to why it 
partially should.  Local climate action—at least in its predominant form—
essentially sidesteps many of the most challenging elements of 
decarbonization, focusing instead on well-established spheres of city 
 
122. Osofsky & Peel, supra note 27, at 784; see also VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 35 
(providing book-length discussion of private governance responses to climate change). 
123. See VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 35, at 138–44, 211–12 (describing how 
corporations can act as regulators of their supply chain and put pressure on utilities to 
invest in more clean energy); Osofsky & Peel, supra note 27, at 784–86. 
124. VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 35, at 13.  Beyond corporate activity, 
Vandenbergh and Gilligan also make the case for engaging households and the not-for-
profit sector in a larger strategy of “private governance.” 
125. Rachlinski, supra note 69, at 318. 
126. See Welton, supra note 8, at 1083–87 (describing state leadership on climate action); see 
also Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the Global Commons: 
The Case of Climate Change, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 183 (2005) (explaining why local action 
on climate change may be rational); Osofsky & Peel, supra note 27; Jim Rossi, Carbon 
Taxation by Regulation, 102 MINN. L. REV. 277, 298–320 (2017) (cataloguing state laws 
on low-carbon energy); Katherine A. Trisolini, All Hands on Deck: Local Governments 
and the Potential for Bidirectional Climate Change Regulation, 62 STAN. L. REV. 669 
(2010) (arguing for the importance of multiscalar strategies). 
127. See Who’s In, WE ARE STILL IN, https://www.wearestillin.com/signatories  
[https://perma.cc/59TZ-WMGK] (showing membership comprises 287 cities and 
counties, ten states, and thousands of corporations as of October 2019). 
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control.128  But cities that want to make a meaningful dent in their emissions 
often quickly realize that doing so requires the ability to control the source of 
their energy.129  In most places, legal responsibility for energy supply falls to 
state public utility commissions, rather than local governments,130 such that 
downscaling does not allow a city’s residents to change their energy mix. 
States, on the other hand, have substantial control over the resources 
that power their energy systems.131  However, relying only on those states 
eager to pursue decarbonization cuts out an enormous swath of the country—
and the most carbon-intensive swath at that.132  Thus, a climate strategy that 
looks to states where the political economy is presently amenable to climate 
action misses a substantial portion of U.S. emissions.  This challenge is 
compounded by the physical reality of an interconnected grid—which means 
that state efforts to reduce in-state emissions might just push those emissions 
around the country rather than resulting in true reductions.133 
All that said, the turns to executive action, the private sector, and 
downscaling are understandable responses to the intractability of political 
progress on climate change at the federal level and in many states.  Yet they 
are clearly not enough.  The next Part explains why, before turning to ask 
what more can be done. 
 
128. That is not to say that some traditional areas of local control are not themselves 
impactful: In particular, state and local control over building codes, transportation, and 
development patterns can be critical to emissions reductions efforts.  See Garrick B. 
Pursley & Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. 877, 879 (2011) (tracing the 
ways in which local governments can “facilitat[e] the development and adoption of 
distributed renewable technologies”); Trisolini, supra note 126 (describing importance of 
local governments in addressing climate change). 
129. See Shelley Welton, Public Energy, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 272–73 (2017); see also Al 
Weinrub, Democratizing Municipal-Scale Power, in ENERGY DEMOCRACY: ADVANCING 
EQUITY IN CLEAN ENERGY SOLUTIONS, supra note 40, at 139, 141–42 (describing how 
electricity consumers are traditionally trapped in their utility with “nowhere to turn” 
but the “state’s regulatory body” for relief). 
130. See William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of Federalism: Ratemaking and Policy 
Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 810, 813–14 (2016) (tracing the 
central role of state public utility commissions in decarbonization). 
131. See 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2018) (reserving to the states control over electricity generation 
and retail sales of electricity). 
132. States that typically vote Republican—“red states”—are less likely to support action on 
climate change and (relatedly) have higher carbon emissions.  Analysts reported that 
“[t]he 12 states with the highest per person emissions of the main heat-trapping gas, 
carbon dioxide, voted for Trump in 2016.  The 10 states with the lowest per person 
carbon emissions voted for Hillary Clinton.”  Seth Borenstein & Steve Peoples, Too Hot 
to Handle: Politics of Warming Part of Culture Wars, AP NEWS (June 20, 2018), 
https://apnews.com/7b1f8a502f1843e8b562cd2fece9f6a2/Too-hot-to-handle:-Politics-of-
warming-part-of-culture-wars [https://perma.cc/3JS7-NQ39]. 
133. See infra notes 317–320. 
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II. DISAGGREGATING DECARBONIZATION 
The double democratic deficit facing efforts to mitigate climate change 
helps explain why recent efforts to decarbonize have largely worked around the 
people rather than through them.  But as this Part explains, these workarounds 
deliver only a fraction of the decarbonization we need.  In light of our anemic 
progress, this Part argues for a reassessment of the accepted wisdom on the 
irrationality of citizen control of decarbonization.  It asserts that there are cracks 
in the wall of insistence that people are ill equipped to contribute to 
decarbonization policymaking—and that an analysis of the choices to be made 
within decarbonization exposes room for more productive engagement. 
A. Evanescent Federal Law, Private and Local Stopgaps 
In an August 3, 2015 speech to announce the promulgation of the Clean 
Power Plan, President Barack Obama called it “the single most important step 
America has ever taken in the fight against global climate change,” critical 
“[f]or the sake of our kids and the health and safety of all Americans.”134  Five 
years later, the plan’s dismemberment is complete.135  The Trump 
administration has similarly dismantled the updated fuel economy standards136 
and announced its planned withdrawal from the world’s leading climate accord, 
the 2015 Paris Agreement.137 
 
134. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, The White House, Remarks by the President in 
Announcing the Clean Power Plan (Aug. 30, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ 
the-press-office/2015/08/03/remarks-president-announcing-clean-power-plan 
[https://perma.cc/X5C5-9HS7]. 
135. See Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions From Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission 
Guidelines Implementing Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July 8, 2019) (codified at 40 
C.F.R. pt. 60) (replacing the Clean Power Plan with a state-controlled process); Jean 
Chemnick & Niina H. Farah, How the Numbers on the EPA’s New Climate Rule Stack Up, 
SCI. AM. (June 21, 2019), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-the-
numbers-on-the-epas-new-climate-rule-stack-up [https://perma.cc/8W3V-CGYN] 
(explaining that the rule does “little itself to lower emissions”). 
136. See Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021–2026 
Passenger Cars and Light Trucks (finalized March 30, 2020) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pts. 85 and 86). 
137. See Note from Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesman, United Nations Sec’y-Gen., to 
Correspondents on the Paris Climate Agreement (Aug. 4, 2017), 
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/note-correspondents/2017-08-04/note-
correspondents-paris-climate-agreement [https://perma.cc/D6NZ-HLMZ] (confirming 
receipt of U.S. communication stating intention to withdraw when eligible to do so in 
November 2020). 
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Just like that, the risks of relying on executive action as a key climate change 
mitigation strategy became glaring.138  What the Obama administration 
constructed in eight years, the Trump administration undid in fewer than four.  
The tumult of federal climate policy has been smoothed somewhat by 
private, state, and local initiatives.  Largely due to these initiatives, U.S. 
renewable energy installations have surged in the past decade and achieved a 
level of cost competitiveness that should continue to propel their growth.139  
In addition, the dramatic deployment of hydraulic fracturing technology has 
caused a substantial shift from coal to natural gas, creating a 14 percent drop 
in U.S. greenhouse gas emissions between 2005 and 2017.140 
Nevertheless, even the most ardent proponents of these workarounds 
are quick to acknowledge that they are at best stopgaps.141  Although 
hydraulic fracturing has helped lower U.S. emissions in recent years, natural 
gas is far from a carbon-free source of energy, and the climate benefits it 
offers may be diminishing.142  Preliminary figures estimate that U.S. 
emissions rose 3.4 percent in 2018, despite a continued drop in the use of 
coal.143  These trends are likely to prevent the United States from meeting its 
 
138. The Obama administration was pushed into using executive action after a 
comprehensive cap-and-trade bill failed to clear the U.S. Senate in 2009.  See The 
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009) (as 
passed by House, June 26, 2009); see also Amanda Reilly & Kevin Bogardus, 7 Years 
Later, Failed Waxman-Markey Bill Still Makes Waves, E&E NEWS (June 27, 2016), 
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060039422 [https://perma.cc/PW2F-FCMW] 
(quoting White House advisor John Podesta on how the administration pivoted from a 
“legislative fix” to “coordinating the agencies”). 
139. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2018 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2050, at 
94 (2018), https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/AEO2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/WJY7-
CN3A] (projecting that even absent any additional policies, renewable generation will increase 
139 percent through 2050, with most growth in wind and solar). 
140. Hydraulic fracturing and climate change, however, have a difficult relationship: Fracked gas 
is likely, in the long term, to prove an impediment to substantial decarbonization, even as it 
offers an improvement over coal.  See Ramón A. Alvarez et al., Assessment of Methane 
Emissions From the U.S. Oil and Gas Supply Chain, 361 SCI. 186 (2018). 
141. See, e.g., VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 35, at 14 (arguing that ultimately, we 
need a “longer-term strategy of adopting more sweeping measures that can address 
the whole scope of the climate problem”). 
142. See Ellen Knickmeyer & Seth Borenstein, Americans’ Energy Use Surges Despite Climate 
Change Concern, AP NEWS (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/ 
7d4c9cc8f8c344fb9b800a5fd9c48866?hootPostID=a01ce7fe3ddb461beeacb635b1aa0bf7 
[https://perma.cc/EG27-T5VY] (explaining that “Americans burned a record amount 
of energy in 2018, with a 10% jump in consumption from booming natural gas helping 
to lead the way”). 
143. Preliminary U.S. Emissions Estimates for 2018, RHODIUM GROUP (Jan. 8, 2019), 
https://rhg.com/research/preliminary-us-emissions-estimates-for-2018 [https://perma.cc/ 
RLF5-5Y2R]. 
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pledge under the Paris Agreement.144  And the Paris pledges themselves are 
hardly the right measure of performance on decarbonization: The United 
Nations calculates that even full implementation of countries’ Paris pledges 
would “very likely” lead to a 3 Celsius warmer planet by 2100.145 
This gap between national pledges to date and necessary reductions means 
that long-term federal efforts to reduce carbon emissions will have to do far more 
than just recreate the federal policies in place before the 2016 presidential 
election.  In the meantime, executive actions, private governance solutions, and 
work through amenable state and local governments are all worthy efforts to chip 
away at the problem.  But as we plug the proverbial dike through these efforts—
and sometimes see it spring new leaks—we must also think about how to build 
toward the longer term, more comprehensive effort that will be necessary.146  
That is this Article’s aim: to take stock of the rationales that have brought us to the 
land of stopgaps, and to ask whether there is room to revisit any of their 
underlying assumptions. 
B. Decarbonization Dismantled: Three Distinct Questions 
Skeptics of more citizen involvement in the project of decarbonization 
suggest that the challenge is ill-suited for the people for reasons that Rob 
Verchick has pithily summed up as “scale, tangibility, and accessibility.”147  
The problem is abstract, the solutions are technical, and the benefits are 
distant in time and space.148  There are reasons to question whether these 
barriers remain as intractable as they are sometimes painted to be.149  But even 
if one accepts that human nature presents these challenges, it is worth 
 
144. Benjamin Storrow, Report: U.S. Falling Far Short of Paris Goals, CLIMATEWIRE (June 28, 2018), 
https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2018/06/28/stories/1060087183 
[https://perma.cc/R9L9-EF3R]. 
145. Country Pledges Still Long Way From Meeting Paris Goals—Latest UNEP Emission Gap Report 
Urges Faster Action, UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE (Oct. 31, 2017), 
https://unfccc.int/news/country-pledges-still-long-way-from-meeting-paris-goals-latest-
unep-emission-gap-report-urges-faster [https://perma.cc/CTY8-FL86]. 
146. See Theda Skocpol, Naming the Problem: What It Will Take to Counter Extremism and 
Engage Americans in the Fight Against Global Warming 11 (Jan. 2013) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://scholars.org/sites/scholars/files/skocpol_captrade_report_ 
january_2013_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/YV8K-9H2Z] (“Climate change warriors will have to 
look beyond elite maneuvers and find ways to address the values and interests of tens of 
millions of U.S. citizens.”). 
147. Verchick, supra note 3, at 991 (emphasis omitted). 
148. See id. 
149. See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text. 
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analyzing whether these barriers permeate decarbonization policy as 
thoroughly as has been assumed. 
Decarbonization is often painted as a singular aim: get rid of the carbon.  
But in fact, decarbonization can be broken down into three distinct questions: 
(1) whether to decarbonize (what is our goal?), (2) how fast to decarbonize 
(what is our timetable?), and (3) how to decarbonize (what changes should we 
make in our lives?). 
Once you break decarbonization down into these component questions, 
it becomes clear that all three are not equally implicated by the flaws of our 
contemporary nature.  The first two questions—whether and how fast—are 
indeed susceptible to the cognitive and cultural challenges detailed in Part I.  
These are the classic “targets and timetables” questions that have bedeviled 
international negotiators throughout decades of climate change 
conferences.150  Getting the answers right depends on assigning adequate 
weight to the interests of people in other places and other times, and on 
accepting evidence that butts up against extensive cultural animosity in many 
parts of the country.  Our cognitive failings may thus provide good reasons 
for not asking people to vote directly on appropriate U.S. decarbonization 
targets to reach by 2050. 
But one need not necessarily take these three questions in order—that is, 
climate policy need not necessarily proceed entirely top-down.151  Instead, we 
might consider beginning conversations about decarbonization with the third 
question—the how—which does not suffer from the same challenges.152  The 
question of how we want our decarbonized world to look is one that has 
immediate, localized impacts that do not require immense technical skills to 
understand.   
 
150. See Todd Stern, Senior Fellow, Cross-Brookings Initiative on Energy & Climate, The Future of 
the Paris Climate Regime (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/the-
future-of-the-paris-climate-regime [https://perma.cc/3H8J-VP8S] (explaining why 
countries rejected the legally binding targets and timetables approaches taken in 
climate accords prior to the Paris Agreement). 
151. Cf. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 42, at 267 (proposing a model of governance where “power 
is decentralized to enable citizens and other actors to utilize their local knowledge to fit 
solutions to their individual circumstances”); Jessica F. Green et al., A Balance of Bottom-Up 
and Top-Down in Linking Climate Policies, 4 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 1064 (2014). 
152. The question of how to decarbonize is of course interrelated with the questions of 
whether and how much to decarbonize—but it need not necessarily be asked last.  See 
infra notes 174–176 and accompanying text on this interrelationship.  That is to say, 
a community does not have to work from established, top-down decarbonization 
targets in order to make infrastructure or lifestyle changes that might have 
decarbonization benefits. 
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Consider some of the choices to be made regarding the how of 
decarbonization: The United States (or individual states) could embrace a 
renaissance of nuclear power, pouring substantial resources into researching 
and testing small, modular, next-generation nuclear plants that would be 
located in communities across the country.153  Or nuclear could be rejected—
as it has been in many countries—as presenting too many of its own 
unacceptable risks of catastrophe.154  Alternatively, states and localities could 
accept the need for significant industrial-scale wind—and perhaps the 
marring of shorelines with offshore wind farms—as one of the most 
economical ways to generate new electricity.155  Of course, such industrial-
scale renewables come with the need for many new transmission lines—
typically a controversial proposition.156  Perhaps residents prefer pricier 
distributed rooftop solar, combined with storage, for the sake of preserving a 
more pristine landscape.157  Or as they consider these options, residents might 
come to decide that they would prefer stricter building codes with dwelling size 
limitations, greater density requirements, or more rigorous energy efficiency 
provisions so as to limit having to build out new energy infrastructure. 
These considerations are largely local and near term.  Wind and solar 
development and their transmission lines present predominantly localized, 
land use and aesthetic impacts.158  Nuclear energy, too, presents the risk of 
near-term local catastrophe and substantial upfront costs, which a 
community must take into account when selecting this technology.159  To be 
sure, nuclear energy also presents a long-term, unsolved waste challenge that 
 
153. See James A. Lake et al., Next Generation Nuclear Power, SCI. AM. (Jan. 26, 2009), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/next-generation-nuclear 
[https://perma.cc/BB6L-AM9X]. 
154. See, e.g., Kerstine Appunn, The History Behind Germany’s Nuclear Phase-Out, CLEAN 
ENERGY WIRE (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/history-
behind-germanys-nuclear-phase-out [https://perma.cc/6TLN-CD5E] (explaining the 
history of Germany’s phaseout of nuclear power). 
155. See Levelized Cost of Energy 2017, LAZARD (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.lazard.com/ 
perspective/levelized-cost-of-energy-2017 [https://perma.cc/5Z3T-HXA7] [hereinafter 
Levelized Cost] (showing land-based, utility-scale wind to be the cheapest renewable source). 
156. See Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for 
Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1801 (2012). 
157. See Levelized Cost, supra note 155 (showing that rooftop solar is three to six times more 
expensive than utility-scale solar). 
158. See Uma Outka, The Renewable Energy Footprint, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 241, 243–44 
(2011).  Interstate transmission lines, however, present more complicated 
interregional tradeoffs.  See sources cited infra note 169. 
159. See Sylvia Pfeifer, High Costs and Renewables Challenge the Case for Nuclear Power, FIN. 
TIMES (June 14, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/21305834-5376-11e8-84f4-43d65af59d43 
[https://perma.cc/Q9E2-PU8N]. 
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creates many of the same pathologies as climate change, such as pushing costs 
onto future generations while reaping present-day benefits.160  But the lack of 
long-term nuclear waste storage itself creates a more immediate risk: Most of 
this waste must be temporarily stored onsite, creating its own risks of terrorist 
attacks or accidental contamination.161  That means that a community 
contemplating nuclear energy ultimately shoulders many of these risks in the 
relatively near-term.  Thus, although one can never entirely escape the 
cognitive errors caused by intertemporal tradeoffs when making long-lived 
infrastructure decisions, the effects are at least dampened in the case of many 
clean energy technologies. 
The challenges of cultural cognition are also lessened by a focus on the 
question of how to decarbonize.  When focused on questions of infrastructure 
and physical landscape, communities are not forced to disavow or accept 
culturally charged facts but rather can explore how they want to shape their 
community together.162  Still, one might think that infrastructural decisions 
are best left for the experts.  And indeed, decarbonization strategies clearly 
involve some technical elements that require expertise to properly analyze 
and communicate.  But experts are hardly in agreement themselves about the 
best way to achieve these goals—suggesting that there is no obvious 
technocratic fix and at least some room for values-based citizen input.163 
 
160. See Bruce R. Huber, Checks, Balances, and Nuclear Waste, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1169 (2016) 
(detailing the federal government’s abysmal management of the nuclear waste challenge). 
161. See id. at 1197–1201. 
162. See Verchick, supra note 3 (arguing, with respect to climate adaptation, that 
communities will be more receptive to climate change messages when framed as part of 
a conversation about future community character).  These less charged questions could 
be explored by a community either in response to a decarbonization mandate from the 
state or federal government or independently, before such a mandate is in place.  There 
are strong indications that many communities might choose to pursue renewable 
energy even absent a mandate from above.  See infra Subpart II.C. 
163. See, e.g., Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit 
Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1566 (2002) (observing 
that people “value the lives of others” and care about fairness in ways that technocratic 
analyses often fail to take into account); Sunstein, supra note 84, at 1121 (“[R]isk 
regulation is no mere technocratic exercise.  If people’s values lead them to show special 
concern with certain risks, government should take that concern into account.”); 
Verchick, supra note 3, at 987 (“[E]motional responses have political content that are 
valuable, even necessary, for democratic deliberation.”); Kahan et al., Fear of 
Democracy, supra note 85, at 1106 (arguing that experts “have no special competence to 
identify what vision of society . . . the law should endorse” and that it “should be a 
matter of public deliberation”); David Roberts, A Beginner’s Guide to the Debate Over 
100% Renewable Energy, VOX (Feb. 6, 2018, 8:53 AM), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-
environment/2017/4/4/14942764/100-renewable-energy-debate [https://perma.cc/LD83-
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We still do not know enough about the public’s energy preferences—
likely because energy law has long been such a technocratic space that we 
hardly thought to ask.164  But emerging research suggests some striking trends 
in public preferences: Americans of all stripes rank considerations of 
environmental harms as twice as important as considerations of cost.165  
Concerns in particular about local environmental harms push people to favor 
clean sources of energy.166  We know far less about how Americans might 
view the tradeoffs among clean sources of energy—but given people’s 
predilections to focus on local harms, strong opinions in this respect are likely 
to emerge as the environmental tradeoffs among cleaner energy sources 
become clearer.167  All of these preferences speak to the question of how we 
should decarbonize. 
Moreover, recent research suggests that widespread support for clean 
energy translates beyond the resources themselves to the infrastructure necessary 
to support them.  In a 2019 study, researchers found that survey participants’ 
knowledge that a transmission line was carrying electricity produced from 
renewable energy, rather than fossil fuels, made respondents “significantly more 
supportive” of such a line being sited nearby—even though the physical 
characteristics of the transmission infrastructure would be identical in either 
case.168  This finding has important implications regarding citizen support of the 
substantial buildout in transmission infrastructure necessary to support 
decarbonization—suggesting that it may be easier to obtain approval for these 
lines than it has been for past projects, and that citizen involvement in these 
decisions may be less problematic than presumed.169 
 
2B5L]  (cataloguing disagreements among experts as to the role that technologies other than 
renewables should or must play in decarbonization). 
164. See ANSOLABEHERE & KONISKY, supra note 12, at 5–13 (noting dearth of social science 
research on what the public wants from the energy system). 
165. See id. at 14, 98 (finding that in people’s thinking about energy, “the weight of 
perceived harms is at least twice the weight of perceived costs,” id. at 98). 
166. See id. at 169 (explaining that opinions about energy sources are driven primarily by 
local concerns about “air pollution, water pollution, and toxic wastes”). 
167. Stephen Ansolabehere and David Konisky suggest that people do not care about the 
source of their energy—just its attributes.  Id. at 69.  Thus, people will only differentiate 
clean energy sources from one another if they perceive that these sources carry different 
localized environmental burdens.  The examples I lay out, see text accompanying supra 
notes 155–157, are intended to illustrate that, in fact, clean energy sources are not all 
created equal in terms of community and environmental impacts. 
168. See Sanya Carley et al., Are All Electrons the Same? Evaluating Support for Local 
Transmission Lines Through an Experiment, PLOS ONE, July 2019, 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0219066 [https://perma.cc/DN3A-V7V4]. 
169. There is a long literature on the difficulty of siting transmission lines and the challenges 
this poses to renewable energy development.  See Klass & Wilson, supra note 156; 
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In arguing that we should give people more say on the question of how to 
decarbonize, I am pursuing somewhat of a theoretical inversion.  Classically, 
scholars of administration and democracy suggest that the ends of a particular 
policy should be democratically determined, whereas the means should be left to 
administrative, technocratic experts.170  But this Article has already explored why, 
for climate change mitigation, popular determination of the ends—targets and 
timetables—may be ill-advised.171  For this reason, I do not advocate devolving 
decisions around whether and how fast to decarbonize any further to citizen 
control without state (or federal) law at least setting a floor.172  In this way, 
communities could decide to rise above the many tendencies that make it hard 
for us to embrace adequate decarbonization targets, but they would not be legally 
allowed to unilaterally succumb to these tendencies.173 
But although there are good reasons for cabining citizen control of the 
ends of decarbonization, the means of decarbonization are ripe for more 
citizen input.  These are questions about how we want to live our lives and the 
tradeoffs we are willing to make between cost and other values.  Put another 
way, although decarbonization strategies—such as nuclear, wind, solar, 
building codes, and denser housing—are means in the eyes of 
decarbonization policymakers, they are ends for the people living under 
them, in them, or next to them.  These are questions about how we want our 
communities to look, in our lifetimes and in our children’s lifetimes. 
So far in this Part, I have made the case that the question of how to 
decarbonize is particularly suited to broader citizen input and control.  
 
Alexandra B. Klass & Jim Rossi, Reconstituting the Federalism Battle in Energy 
Transportation, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 423 (2017); Alexandra B. Klass, Takings and 
Transmission, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1079 (2013); Ashley C. Brown & Jim Rossi, Siting 
Transmission Lines in a Changed Milieu: Evolving Notions of the “Public Interest” in 
Balancing State and Regional Considerations, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 705, 710–13 (2010). 
170. See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 218 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 
Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1978) (1922) (observing that legal 
authority in the bureaucratic context is legitimated by the existence of a sphere of 
jurisdiction where “the necessary means of compulsion are clearly defined and their use 
is subject to definite conditions”); Patrick von Maravić & B. Guy Peters, Reconsidering 
Political and Bureaucratic Representation in Modern Government, in POLITICS OF 
REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY: POWER, LEGITIMACY AND PERFORMANCE 65, 69 (B. Guy 
Peters et al. eds., 2015) (“This view that bureaucracy shall function outside of political 
turmoil and conflict, has turned into a cornerstone of normative democratic theory.”). 
171. See supra Part I. 
172. See Jim Rossi & Thomas Hutton, Federal Preemption and Clean Energy Floors, 91 N.C. 
L. REV. 1283 (2013). 
173. See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the 
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1555 (2007) (“[F]ederal floors retain the 
benefits of multiple regulatory voices, protections, and diverse regulatory modalities.”). 
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However, whatever infrastructure a community chooses to pursue must be 
located somewhere.  I want to emphasize that my argument in favor of 
enhanced citizen roles does not necessarily extend to energy siting.  More 
work needs to be done to understand whether preferences for renewable 
energy translate into citizens’ approaching siting decisions with more careful 
attunement to the fair distribution of clean energy infrastructure.  Because 
classic “not in my backyard” concerns and the challenges of environmental 
justice plague siting processes,174 we should be cautious in allowing 
majoritarian politics too much sway in specific siting decisions. 
One additional observation is in order about the interrelatedness of the 
questions of whether, how fast, and how to decarbonize.  If there were no 
technologies capable of replacing fossil fuels, the answer to whether to 
decarbonize would likely be a resounding “no.”  Similarly, if there were a 
cheap and easy substitute available, the world might already be cooling 
down.175  But climate change strategies are neither prohibitively expensive nor 
within easy reach.  The decarbonization technologies currently available 
certainly inform emissions goals and limitations, but solutions also emerge 
from the innovation that legal mandates induce.176  There is, then, an iterative 
relationship between the questions of how fast and how, with the success of 
certain solutions empowering the adoption of stricter targets and timetables, 
which then drive a search for further solutions.177 
Finally, it is worth noting that my parsing of the how from the whether 
and how fast within decarbonization policy is hardly a radical move.  This 
delineation between targets and timetables, on the one hand, and the question 
of how to achieve them, on the other, should feel familiar to environmental 
 
174. For more information on environmental justice and facility siting, see ROBERT D. 
BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1990); Vicki 
Been, What’s Fairness Got to Do With It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally 
Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001 (1993); Gerald Torres, Environmental 
Burdens and Democratic Justice, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 431, 435–36 (1994).  For similar 
reasons, many scholars advocate against the use of direct democracy initiatives in land 
use planning.  See Daniel P. Selmi, Reconsidering the Use of Direct Democracy in 
Making Land Use Decisions, 19 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 293, 295 n.11 (2001) 
(collecting articles taking this stance). 
175. See Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 1 (2007) (attributing the success of the Montreal Protocol to the availability of 
cheap substitutes). 
176. See David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Reorienting State Climate Change Policies to Induce 
Technological Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 835 (2008); Zachary Liscow & Quentin Karpilow, 
Innovation Snowballing and Climate Law, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 387 (2017). 
177. I return to explore how this iterative relationship creates space for democratic input 
infra Subpart I.C. 
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law scholars.  It is the same distinction that underpins many federal 
environmental statutes, which operate on a model of cooperative federalism 
that leaves many compliance decisions to state regulators.178  Of course, this 
cooperative federalist model does not go so far as to devolve these questions 
below state-level administrators.  Nevertheless, the model operates on a 
similar theory that different states, with different resource endowments and 
political preferences, might choose different means of accomplishing the 
same ends.179  My contention here is that the importance of allowing 
variability in the how of decarbonization counsels for seeking out deeper and 
more impactful citizen engagement. 
C. What Will Citizen Engagement and Empowerment Yield? 
If one accepts that people’s opinions about how to decarbonize are 
worth considering, the next critical question is: What results can enhanced 
participation expect to yield?  After all, this Article is driven by a 
consequentialist argument that more citizen control will improve the state of 
the climate.  I adopt this consequentialist stance largely as a reaction to the 
vast climate change literature that has adopted antidemocratic positions for 
similarly consequentialist reasons (to wit: because human nature is bad at 
dealing with the problem).180  Although compelling nonconsequentialist 
 
178. Most relevantly, the Clean Air Act’s cooperative federalist system operates through the 
establishment of national ambient air quality standards, which states are given 
flexibility to meet through self-determined “state implementation plans.”  See 42 U.S.C 
§ 7410 (2018); Holly Doremus & W. Michael Hanemann, Of Babies and Bathwater: 
Why the Clean Air Act’s Cooperative Federalism Framework is Useful for Addressing 
Global Warming, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 799, 800 (2008).  This same federalist structure 
undergirds the provision of the Clean Air Act used to craft the Clean Power Plan, 
which established a firm carbon emissions reductions commitment for each state but 
allowed the states to craft their own strategies for achieving the required reductions.  
See 42 U.S.C. § 7411; Clean Power Plan, supra note 118.  Michael Livermore has 
championed this architecture for its ability to not only induce technological innovation 
but also produce information about what decarbonization pathways might prove 
politically viable in various states across the country.  Michael A. Livermore, The Perils 
of Experimentation, 126 YALE L.J. 636, 644 (2017); see also Doremus & Hanemann, 
supra note 178, at 800, 826 (arguing that a state emissions reduction plan requirement, 
modeled on State Implementation Plans, is an intelligent way to go about reducing 
carbon emissions in the United States). 
179. See Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 178, at 828; Livermore, supra note 178, at 694.  
The Clean Air Act contains some public consultation requirements during 
development of “State Implementation Plans”—but these take the form of government-
to-government consultations and public hearings.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(M).  My 
suggestions go beyond this limited form of citizen engagement. 
180. See supra Subpart I.B. 
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rationales are often advanced in support of participatory democracy and may 
well apply here,181 these are unlikely to convince those who think that citizen 
control of decarbonization would lead to humanity’s self-inflicted demise via 
climate change.  
In this Subpart, I build the case for why asking people how they want 
their energy system to look is unlikely to bring on climate catastrophe, and to 
the contrary, might be an important part of advancing federal climate policy.  
The argument has three components, which focus in turn on (1) divergent 
preferences between people and their elected politicians, (2) the psychology 
of enhanced control, and (3) the political economy of energy policy across the 
United States. 
1. Divergent Preferences Between People and Politicians 
To a certain extent, the premise of this Article springs from a simple fact: 
People are not getting what they want out of the U.S. energy system.  
Although representative government is in theory supposed to be more 
enlightened than direct democratic rule,182 it appears to be failing in 
delivering the clean energy that people want.  In 2018, fossil fuels still 
produced 64 percent of U.S. electricity (with coal at 27 percent and natural gas 
at 35 percent), while nuclear energy produced 19 percent, hydropower and wind 
each produced around 7 percent, and solar energy produced only 1.5 percent.183  
Based on present policies, the U.S. Energy Information Administration projects 
that fossil fuels will continue to supply 56 percent of U.S. electricity in 
 
181. See BARBER, supra note 44, at 7–9 (critiquing theorists of liberal, “thin” democracy for 
their focus on the preservation of individual rights as the end goal); Sklansky, supra 
note 47, at 1758, 1770 (explaining that historically, “[a]dvocates of participatory 
democracy thought much of the value of democracy lay in the way it facilitated 
individual development and enriched social interaction,” id. at 1758, and made “people 
feel connected to and satisfied with their government,” id. at 1770).  See Conclusion 
infra for a few thoughts regarding the potential intrinsic benefits of democratizing 
decarbonization. 
182. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 81–82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
183. What is U.S. Electricity Generation by Energy Source?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=427&t=3 [https://perma.cc/9U6S-PEEA] (last 
updated Feb. 27, 2020). 
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2050184—a time by which climate experts calculate that the electricity mix 
needs to be carbon-free.185  
As mentioned in Subpart II.B, recent research has overwhelmingly 
documented that Americans want more clean energy than the political 
system currently demands that utilities produce.  In their ten-year project to 
survey American attitudes about energy, Stephen Ansolabehere and David 
Konisky find that Americans across the political spectrum prefer greater 
investment in solar and wind energy above all other sources, even if they cost 
a little more—which they often now do not.186  These findings should give us 
comfort that inviting more citizen engagement with the project of energy 
governance—even in red states with no climate change laws on the books—is 
not a dangerous proposition for the state of the climate.  It is unlikely that we 
will see many Americans, if given a greater say in their energy system, opting 
to run on 100 percent coal.  To the contrary, there is reason to believe that 
most communities will choose a cleaner system than their utility is delivering.  
Hence, giving people more control over how the energy system looks—even 
without any decarbonization mandate in place—is likely to yield climate-
friendly results. 
Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge the motivations that 
Ansolabehere and Konisky uncover in their research: Americans’ clean 
energy preferences have less to do with climate change and more to do with 
local environmental harms like air and water pollution.187  This focus on local 
impacts will bring side benefits for the climate, given that solar and wind 
produce fewer local emissions in addition to being carbon-free.  But locally 
clean energy sources do not align fully with the goal of deep decarbonization: 
Although people tend to “hate coal and love solar,”188 they also display 
substantial acceptance of natural gas, which burns much cleaner locally than 
 
184. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2019 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2050, at 
21 (2019), https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/aeo2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/J87J-UB2C] 
(projecting natural gas will supply 39 percent and coal will supply 17 percent of U.S. 
electricity in 2050). 
185. See sources cited supra note 60. 
186. See ANSOLABEHERE & KONISKY, supra note 12, at 51–53; see also Reed Landberg & Anna 
Hirtenstein, Coal Is Being Squeezed Out of Power by Cheap Renewables, BLOOMBERG 
(June 21, 2018, 1:16 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-
19/coal-is-being-squeezed-out-of-power-industry-by-cheap-renewables 
[https://perma.cc/9JSJ-Q4XR]. 
187. See ANSOLABEHERE & KONISKY, supra note 12, at 127 (noting that climate change 
concern does seem to increase support for nuclear power, but otherwise, the issue “is 
felt very much in local terms”). 
188. Id. at 97. 
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coal but may be almost as devastating for the planet.189  And Americans are far 
less supportive of nuclear energy than natural gas, even though carbon-free 
nuclear energy is more appealing from the vantage of climate change.190 
Accordingly, citizen-led energy decisionmaking is likely to help with 
decarbonization by bringing the U.S. energy supply more in line with Americans’ 
desires for clean energy.  But it will still leave a substantial “emissions gap” 
to fill between realized preferences and necessary decarbonization targets.191  
However, there is reason to hope that enhanced citizen control might also 
enhance people’s understanding of the magnitude of the climate challenge 
itself, for reasons that have to do with emerging insights into the psychology 
of climate change. 
2. The Psychology of Climate Change: Control and Action 
Part I of this Article explored what psychology teaches us about the reasons 
for inaction on climate change.  This same research also points to some 
important conclusions about how citizen control might induce more action. 
Recall the discussion about cultural cognition: People’s feelings about 
climate change and decarbonization largely follow their worldviews, as we all 
engage in motivated reasoning that causes us to filter our interpretations of 
science through cultural lenses.192  The next question becomes, why, exactly, 
we are motivated to engage in this rationalizing process.193  One important 
answer to this question in the context of climate change is “solution 
 
189. Even if cleaner than coal, natural gas extraction and combustion still create 
considerable carbon emissions and, by some estimates, may result in nearly as many 
overall greenhouse gas emissions as coal.  See Alvarez et al., supra note 140, at 186 
(finding natural gas emissions may be 60 percent higher than EPA estimates).  In 
Ansolabehere and Konisky’s surveys, 43–65 percent of people rated coal as moderately 
or very harmful, whereas 14–25 percent of people rated natural gas as moderately or 
very harmful, suggesting that Americans are far more willing to accept natural gas than 
coal as an energy source.  See ANSOLABEHERE & KONISKY, supra note 12, at 86–87. 
190. See ANSOLABEHERE & KONISKY, supra note 12, at 59 (stating that in 2011, 60.4 percent of 
Americans “somewhat” or “strongly” supported natural gas, whereas that figure was 
30.1 percent for nuclear). 
191. See supra notes 145–146; see also Stephen Ansolabehere & David M. Konisky, The 
American Public’s Energy Choice, DÆDALUS, Spring 2012, at 61, 69 (“[E]ven if all 
Americans thought climate change required immediate action, support for coal would decline 
by only 0.10 on a scale from zero to one, support for solar and wind power would increase by 
only 0.20, and support for nuclear power would actually decline.”). 
192. See supra Subpart I.B. 
193. See Troy H. Campbell & Aaron C. Kay, Solution Aversion: On the Relation Between 
Ideology and Motivated Disbelief, 107 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 809, 809 (2014) 
(inquiring about the source of climate change denial). 
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aversion”—that is, people do not discount the exigency of climate change 
because they hate the idea of the problem so much as they hate the solutions 
available to solve the problem.194 
Oftentimes, climate activists—in sincere attempts to call attention to the 
importance of dramatic action—emphasize that responding to climate 
change will require massive governmental intervention that fundamentally 
reshapes the nature of modern capitalism.195  Unsurprisingly, this message 
does not sit well with many Republicans, who tend to favor less government 
intervention and more reliance on markets.196  But researchers have 
demonstrated that emphasizing to Republicans that market-oriented climate 
change policies are available decreases their skepticism of climate change 
science.  Most notably, Dan Kahan and colleagues found that when it was 
emphasized to Republicans197 that geoengineering (intentional, largescale 
human manipulation of the atmosphere to cool the planet) is a method of 
responding to climate change, their level of concern about climate change as a 
problem rose substantially.198  Kahan posits that communicating 
geoengineering as a solution was effective because “[g]eoengineering is 
consonant with a narrative that depicts human technological ingenuity as the 
 
194. Id. at 811 (“The solution aversion model proposed here predicts that people will be 
skeptical of scientific evidence supporting the existence of a problem, to the degree that 
the existence of the problem directly implies solutions that threaten a person’s 
cherished beliefs and ideological motives.” (citations omitted)); see also Kahan et al., 
Geoengineering, supra note 16; Isabel L. Rossen et al., The Desire to Maintain the Social 
Order and the Right to Economic Freedom: Two Distinct Moral Pathways to Climate 
Change Scepticism, 42 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 42, 43 (2015) (suggesting that it is “the notion of 
acting on climate change” that is “morally threatening to conservatives”). 
195. Journalist Naomi Klein perhaps captured this sentiment best in the title of her 2015 
book on climate change, This Changes Everything.  In her view, the rise in climate 
denial among conservatives stems from their realization that “as soon as they admit 
that climate change is real, they will lose the central ideological battle of our time—
whether we need to plan and manage our societies to reflect our goals and values, or 
whether that task can be left to the magic of the market.”  NAOMI KLEIN, THIS CHANGES 
EVERYTHING: CAPITALISM VS. THE CLIMATE 40 (2014). 
196. Campbell & Kay, supra note 193, at 811 (explaining that common climate policy 
solutions, including taxes and emissions restrictions, “contradict the ideologies of many 
Republicans; in particular, ideological beliefs in the efficacy of free markets and limited 
government regulation”); see also Rossen et al., supra note 194, at 42 (identifying 
“maintenance of social order and free market ideology” as two independent drivers of 
climate change skepticism). 
197. Kahan’s research focuses on “hierarchical individualists” as a category—a group that is 
generally, but not perfectly, correlated with membership in the Republican party.  See 
Kahan, Fixing Failure, supra note 27, at 296; Kahan et al., Geoengineering, supra note 
16, at 194, 199.  But see Verchick, supra note 3, at 974, 976–77, 988 (“Those values may, 
but do not always, correspond with partisan commitments.”). 
198. See Kahan et al., Geoengineering, supra note 16, at 201–03. 
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principal means by which our species has succeeded in overcoming 
environmental constraints on its flourishing.”199  Consequently, 
geoengineering affirms Republican values.200  Kahan derives from these 
findings a recommendation that climate change communicators “look[] for 
ways to dissipate the meanings that make large, politically consequential 
segments of the population dismissive” of climate change.201 
I read the solution aversion research to offer another potential takeaway: 
a feeling of enhanced control over the solutions to climate change might help 
bolster acceptance of the problem and of laws that drive forward solutions.202  
Communities with enhanced decisionmaking control could decide to 
decarbonize in ways that felt most consonant with their character—and solutions 
might include nuclear power, local self-sufficiency, and a host of other 
ideologically diverse options.  Just as a broadened understanding of the solution 
set to climate change leads to greater acceptance of the challenge, we might expect 
this enhanced control to augment people’s willingness to tackle the problem. 
Here, then, is the iterative potential of pursuing more citizen 
engagement with energy: The devolution of more control over the energy 
supply to everyday citizens would likely lead to a decision to pursue more 
clean energy, which might both drive down prices of clean energy 
technologies and fuel enhanced acceptance of decarbonization targets and 
timetables.  The necessity of meeting targets and timetables, in turn, might 
create a push for even more citizen control of the energy system, as people 
came to understand the desirability of shaping their own energy supply 
during a period of rapid change.  And so on.203 
More citizen-centered energy governance could thus create a virtuous 
cycle between the questions of whether and how fast to decarbonize, and 
enhanced citizen control of the question of how to build a decarbonized 
 
199. Id. at 206. 
200. See id. at 200; see also Campbell & Kay, supra note 193 (producing similar results). 
201. Kahan et al., Geoengineering, supra note 16, at 206. 
202. See Gifford, supra note 3, at 293 (explaining that “people sometimes do not act because 
they perceive that they have little behavioral control over the outcome,” and that 
“[p]erceived behavioral control can be a very strong predictor” of willingness to act).  
Moreover, according to findings by Isabel L. Rossen, Patrick D. Dunlop, and Carmen 
M. Lawrence, placing value on the “maintenance of social order” leads to climate 
skepticism—such that the ability to choose solutions that accord with one’s views of an 
ordered society should help lessen skepticism.  See Rossen et al., supra note 194, at 42. 
203. See infra notes 308–311 for an example of this dynamic at work in California. 
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world.  Even though climate change cannot be solved on the local scale,204 
providing agency at the community level might ultimately help people 
become comfortable supporting more stringent state and national 
decarbonization targets because they will have more control in the shape of 
how these targets are met.205  In this way, enhancing citizen input into energy 
governance may be an important step in reshaping American values on 
energy and climate change to accord with the new biogeophysical reality we 
all face today.206 
3. The Political Economy of Citizen Control 
More citizen engagement and empowerment in energy decisionmaking 
can only improve climate outcomes if efforts to reform energy governance are 
more successful than efforts to directly mandate reduced carbon emissions.  
After all, such reforms will themselves require legislative or regulatory 
changes.207  And if citizen control of energy is to make a meaningful dent in 
climate pollution, it will have to spread beyond the bright blue zones of the 
U.S. electoral map.208 
I contend that the prospect of enhancing citizen control over energy 
holds much broader political appeal than decarbonization—such that it 
might flourish as a strategy even where direct efforts to address climate 
change fail.  The reasons that one might prefer greater control over one’s 
energy system go far beyond climate change (and, indeed, may have little to 
do with climate change).209  Those who support independent local 
government and the freedom to “break up” with monopoly utilities will find 
much to like about proposals to give citizens greater control over their energy 
 
204. See Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate 
Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1962 (2007) (“[L]ocal action is not well suited to 
regulating mobile global conduct yielding a global externality.”). 
205. This theory accords with the logic underlying the recent strand of scholarship 
celebrating federalism as the “new nationalism” for its ability to “integrat[e] rather than 
divid[e] the national polity.”  Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: 
An Overview, 123 YALE L.J. 1889, 1889–92 (2014); see also Abbe R. Gluck, Our 
[National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996, 1997 (2014) (showing how state-level 
implementation renders federal legislation “more politically palatable”). 
206. See Purdy, supra note 2. 
207. Part III treats in more detail several proposals for legislative or regulatory changes that 
might effectively democratize energy. 
208. See supra note 132. 
209. See ANSOLABEHERE & KONISKY, supra note 12. 
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systems.210  This framing helps to explain otherwise surprising headlines such 
as “Solar Energy Advocates Find Unexpected Ally in Tea Party.”211 
Importantly, more participatory energy decisionmaking may also be a 
stepping stone on the path to more overtly climate-focused policies.  Where 
enhanced citizen control proliferates, the utility will lose some of its economic 
and political clout.212  This, in turn, may open space for legislative or 
regulatory solutions specifically targeted at promoting decarbonization and 
clean energy—which the utility might have been able to roundly defeat 
before, but which may now have the backing of communities that can claim 
economic leverage within the energy sector.213 
III. INSTITUTIONS, POWER, AND INFLUENCE: EFFECTIVE ENGAGEMENT  
AND EMPOWERMENT IN THE ENERGY SPACE 
This Article contends that the democratic challenges plaguing 
decarbonization still leave room for putting the question of how to decarbonize 
to citizens and that doing so will improve the state of the climate.  But if you take 
the double democratic deficit seriously, involving people more even in this 
element of decarbonization policy remains challenging.  It will not be enough 
simply to improve notice-and-comment processes or mandate more hearings.  
There are reasons to be quite skeptical that energy’s dominant governing 
institutions can blossom into sites of true deliberation or citizen empowerment.  
Even in less abstruse agencies, dominated less by repeat, monopoly corporate 
 
210. See MORRIS & JUNGJOHANN, supra note 40, at 93 (describing the politics of energy 
democracy in Germany as “not partisan” and recognizing that “citizens wanted the 
right to make their own energy so they could decide how it is made”). 
211. Kelly McEvers et al., Solar Energy Advocates Find Unexpected Ally in Tea Party, NPR (Feb. 
24, 2015, 4:16 PM), https://www.npr.org/2015/02/24/388796105/solar-energy-advocates-
find-unexpected-ally-in-tea-party [https://perma.cc/M6UU-JSQF]; see also MORRIS & 
JUNGJOHANN, supra note 40, at 111 (“German conservatives support the Energiewende 
specifically because it strengthens communities.”); Rossen et al., supra note 194. 
212. See, e.g., Sammy Roth, Here’s How Local Governments Are Replacing California’s Biggest 
Utilities, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2019, 3:00 AM) https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-clean-
power-alliance-wind-energy-20181225-story.html [https://perma.cc/82MW-5R78] 
(describing the shift from utility service to community-controlled systems in 
California, where proliferating programs “shift control from private monopolies to 
local governments”); see also infra Subparts III.B–C. 
213. Cf. MORRIS & JUNGJOHANN, supra note 40, at 104 (“Citizen participation has been 
crucial toward raising acceptance levels for the energy transition in Germany.”); Biber 
et al., supra note 35, at 609 (describing how jurisdictions can develop ever-stronger 
“political will” for emissions reductions policy through gradualism). 
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players,214 scholars have documented how greater notice-and-comment 
responsiveness, public hearings, and ballot initiatives often benefit the economic 
elite while failing to induce meaningful citizen participation.215 
Creating true empowerment around decisions about where our energy 
should come from, and what requirements should be placed on its use, 
demands more substantial restructuring of the institutions that shape our 
energy supply.  Citizens must come to feel like they not only have values 
worthy of expressing with respect to decarbonization, but that it will matter if 
they take the time to express them.216 
It also will not be enough merely to give every consumer the right to 
purchase renewable energy, solar panels, or energy efficiency devices in the 
hope that they choose to do so.217  In many places, people have long had the 
ability to individually opt in to purchasing clean energy at a higher price—
with little to show for it.218  Staring alone at a box on a utility bill that says 
“check here to pay $5 for green electrons,” one can easily feel like only a 
sucker would pay more to tackle a problem that seven billion people have 
helped to create and may never solve.219  Research confirms that without the 
 
214. See Shelley Welton & Joel Eisen, Clean Energy Justice: Charting an Emerging Agenda, 43 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 307, 343–48 (2019). 
215. See, e.g., Stephen M. Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects: ACUS, Rulemaking 2.0, and a 
Vision for Broader, More Informed, and More Transparent Rulemaking, 65 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 77, 82–83 (2013) (finding that few rules receive comments, and most of these 
come from regulated entities); Sitaraman, supra note 104, at 1453–54 (describing the 
paradox of process in administrative law, which “holds that as procedural safeguards 
increase to preserve democratic access or rights, elite economic interests will perversely 
be better able to navigate those complexities”); Wendy Wagner et al., Rulemaking in the 
Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 
99, 103–04 (2011) (finding imbalances in interest group participation “over the entire 
life cycle” of certain environmental regulations); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb 
Yackee, A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 
68 J. POL. 128, 137 (2006); Welton & Eisen, supra note 214 (empirically examining the low 
participation rate of community groups in energy proceedings).  But see Cuéllar, supra note 
19, at 460 (finding that for two of the three regulations he studied, “comments from 
individual members of the lay public account[ed] for over 70% of comments”). 
216. See JAMES S. FISHKIN, WHEN THE PEOPLE SPEAK: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC 
CONSULTATION 95–104 (2009). 
217. I document the limitations of this strategy at much greater length in Welton, supra note 
21. 
218. See Cass R. Sunstein & Lucia A. Reisch, Automatically Green: Behavioral Economics and 
Environmental Protection, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 127, 135 (2014) (“In Germany, 
many people say that they would use green energy if presented with a choice, but very 
few consumers actually opt for green . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
219. See Ansolabehere & Konisky, supra note 191, at 64 (“Public opinion, of course, does not 
mirror the marketplace.  In fact, it may reflect what does not happen in the private 
sector.” (emphasis omitted)); Sheila Jasanoff, Technologies of Humility: Citizen 
100 67 UCLA L. REV. 56 (2020) 
ability to drive infrastructural decisions writ large, people despair of their 
ability to affect the changes they want to see in the energy system.220 
Moreover, individualized decisions—while they may put some pressure 
on utilities by eroding their bottom line221—cannot create change at the scale 
that will be necessary to construct viable, society-wide alternatives to the 
fossil fuel–powered energy system.  To create change at scale requires legal 
reforms that shift the balance of political and economic power within the U.S. 
energy system—a system that has been notoriously resistant to change.222 
Fortunately, there are several important precedents to draw upon in 
forging creative legal pathways capable of overcoming the double democratic 
deficit.  In this Part, I illustrate how two complementary strategies—(1) 
reforming utility planning processes and (2) enhancing community control 
over energy—could rework citizens’ ability to influence their energy supply in 
ways that should redound to the benefit of the global climate.  I outline these 
strategies only in broad brushstrokes; other resources go into detail on their 
mechanics and implementation.223  My focus here is on how these reforms 
 
Participation in Governing Science, 41 MINERVA 223, 240 (2003) (arguing for the 
imperative of developing a “dependable civic epistemology”); see also supra notes 67–68 
and accompanying text (on why it is difficult to make individual contributions to 
climate change feel like moral wrongs). 
220. See ANSOLABEHERE & KONISKY, supra note 12, at 66–67 (finding that although people 
generally agree on what they want out of the energy system, they are exceedingly 
pessimistic that it will be achieved); MORRIS & JUNGJOHANN, supra note 40, at 116 
(emphasizing the importance of community-scale, rather than just individual, efforts in 
fueling acceptance and growth of the German energy transition); Ackerman & Heinzerling, 
supra note 163, at 1567 (“It is often impossible to arrive at a meaningful social valuation by 
adding up the willingness to pay expressed by individuals.”). 
221. Utilities have complained that rooftop solar creates a death spiral for the industry as 
customers exit utility service and push system costs onto an ever-smaller remaining group of 
consumers, creating more pressure to leave.  See PETER KIND, EDISON ELEC. INST., DISRUPTIVE 
CHALLENGES: FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO A CHANGING RETAIL 
ELECTRIC BUSINESS 6–9 (2013), https://www.ourenergypolicy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/disruptivechallenges-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ARR-2SF6]. 
222. See RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND 
RESTRUCTURING IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM (1999) (describing the grand 
compromise between electric utilities and their regulators that dominated the twentieth 
century); ORESKES & CONWAY, supra note 107 (documenting the climate denial movement). 
223. For more information on reforming utility planning processes, see RACHEL WILSON & BRUCE 
BIEWALD, SYNAPSE ENERGY ECON., INC., BEST PRACTICES IN ELECTRIC UTILITY INTEGRATED 
RESOURCE PLANNING: EXAMPLES OF STATE REGULATIONS AND RECENT UTILITY PLANS 5 fig.2 
(2013), https://www.raponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/rapsynapse-
wilsonbiewald-bestpracticesinirp-2013-jun-21.pdf [https://perma.cc/SU8P-JTFE].  For more 
on enhancing community control over energy, see CALIFORNIA PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, 
COMMUNITY CHOICE AGGREGATION EN BANC BACKGROUND PAPER 7 (2017), 
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC_Public_Website/Content/About_Us/C
CABackgroundPaperv2.pdf [https://perma.cc/26H8-432W]; J.R. DESHAZO ET AL., 
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might help confront the double democratic deficit and ultimately influence 
the national climate conversation. 
A. Give Utilities the Chance to Respond to Consumers’ Values 
My first proposal works within the existing framework of public utility law.  
Public utility law is the governing body of law that has shaped the U.S. energy 
system almost since the advent of electricity.224  Both the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission and state public utility commissions manage private, 
investor-owned electricity companies as public utilities.225  Regulators set the 
prices that public utilities are allowed to charge to consumers, review and vet 
their long-term management plans and strategies, and ensure that utilities 
provide safe and adequate service to all persons within their service territories.226 
In these ways, public utility law remains unusual for the degree of 
control it exerts over private enterprise—a Progressive-era relic in 
deregulated times.227  But it often operates through deeply technical, 
adjudicative processes, which prove difficult sites for participation.228  I 
believe an effort to marry the power of public utility law to shape corporate 
behavior with fresh attempts to open this space to citizen input holds 
substantial potential to transform the energy system. 
Decarbonizing energy is, at its core, a massive exercise in forward thinking 
about what long-lived infrastructure investments and contractual arrangements 
make sense in a rapidly changing geophysical and political landscape.229  
Fortunately, states already control long-term utility planning to a significant 
 
UCLA LUSKIN CTR. FOR INNOVATION, THE PROMISES AND CHALLENGES OF COMMUNITY 
CHOICE AGGREGATION IN CALIFORNIA 11 (2017), https://innovation.luskin.ucla.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2019/03/The_Promises_and_Challenges_of_Community_Choice_Ag
gregation_in_CA.pdf [https://perma.cc/X82Q-E85W]; Uma Outka, Cities and the Low-
Carbon Grid, 46 ENVTL. L. 105 (2016); Welton, supra note 129; What is CCA?, LEAN ENERGY, 
http://leanenergyus.org/what-is-cca [https://perma.cc/56E5-MECV]. 
224. See Boyd, supra note 22, at 1629. 
225. Id. at 1629–30. 
226. See ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 3 
(1988).  For more on the complexities of modern public utility law, see Boyd & Carlson, 
supra note 130. 
227. See RAHMAN, supra note 30, at 131 (celebrating the legal robustness of the public utility 
concept); Boyd, supra note 22, at 1635–43 (tracing the Progressive principles 
underlying public utility law). 
228. See Welton & Eisen, supra note 214, at 343. 
229. See generally Jonas J. Monast & Sarah K. Adair, A Triple Bottom Line for Electric Utility 
Regulation: Aligning State-Level Energy, Environmental, and Consumer Protection 
Goals, 38 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2013). 
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degree through a legal process called integrated resource planning.230  As of 
2013, thirty-nine states had or were developing some sort of integrated or 
long-term resource plan filing requirement.231  In these plans, utilities detail 
anticipated future electricity demand growth and how they intend to meet this 
growth over a ten- to twenty-year planning horizon, typically with the aims of 
minimizing cost while ensuring reliability.232 
Normally, regulators evaluate these plans with a limited understanding 
of what citizens in the utility’s service area want out of their future energy 
system.233  To be sure, regulators often have a sense of what the most 
interested stakeholders want to see234—but do not know whether these 
stakeholders represent outlier or mainstream public sentiment.235  A relatively 
simple fix could round out this picture: The legal requirements for these plans 
could be amended to include reporting on the relative level of public support 
that various future energy scenarios receive.  Thus, when reporting on price 
and resource characteristic differences between, say, largescale wind and solar 
investments and a new nuclear plant, the utility might also have to include a 
description of how citizens to be served by these two options weigh their 
relative merits.  In other words, utilities would have to ask their customers the 
how question, about what they want the future energy system to look like. 
Requiring utilities to report on citizen energy preferences would 
enhance broad-based citizen input without devolving power or control.  It is 
thus a variety of citizen engagement—rooted in the theory that exposing 
decisionmakers to either a sample of citizen opinions, or better, live citizen 
deliberation, will produce better outcomes.236  Instead of commission-led 
 
230. See generally WILSON & BIEWALD, supra note 223; RACHEL WILSON & PAUL PETERSON, 
SYNAPSE ENERGY ECON., INC., A BRIEF SURVEY OF STATE INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLANNING 
RULES AND REQUIREMENTS (2011), http://www.cleanskies.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2011/05/ACSF_IRP-Survey_Final_2011-04-28.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WL8-2QJA]. 
231. See WILSON & BIEWALD, supra note 223, at 5 fig.2. 
232. See WILSON & PETERSON, supra note 230, at 7.  In states that have restructured by 
forcing utilities to sell off their generation assets, utilities no longer control what 
generation gets built through planning processes.  But in many states, utilities still have 
to plan for the right supply of long-term contracts and wholesale market power to meet 
future demand and comply with state clean energy laws.  These are often called “long-
term procurement plans.”  See id. at 13–15. 
233. See ANSOLABEHERE & KONISKY, supra note 12. 
234. Most, but not all, state-integrated resource planning processes provide mechanisms for 
stakeholder participation and engagement.  See WILSON & BIEWALD, supra note 223, at 26–27 
(cataloguing some of the best models for stakeholder engagement). 
235. See Fiorino, supra note 49, at 531 (explaining the differences between citizen 
participation and interest group participation). 
236. See FISHKIN, supra note 216, at 140 (extolling the virtues of deliberative polling, where 
citizens discuss options among themselves after asking questions of experts); see also 
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adjudicatory proceedings attracting those few outsiders who are motivated to 
attend—and who lack persuasive authority to claim general 
“representativeness” of their viewpoints237—my proposal puts the onus on 
utilities to seek out a representative sample of the population.  In approaching 
the public, the utility is likely to frame questions in more accessible terms 
than it typically would in the course of integrated resource planning.238  And 
the public, in turn, is likely to take their consultative role seriously because 
policymakers have expressed interest in their opinions.239  All of which, 
hopefully, will make the information gleaned during such engagement 
persuasive to utility planners and regulators as they make critical decisions 
about future energy supply. 
When I first dreamed up the idea of incorporating citizen preferences into 
integrated resource planning, I worried it might be dismissed as unlikely to be 
effective.  But it turns out that it has already been tested and validated in a state 
not well known for its open-armed embrace of large-scale social planning: Texas. 
During the 1990s, Texas had an integrated resource planning process 
that required utilities to begin by surveying and reporting on consumer 
energy “values and preferences.”240  To meet their obligations under this Act, 
Texas utilities collaborated with Lawrence Fishkin of the University of Texas, 
a pioneer in “deliberative polling.”241  Each utility convened up to 250 
randomly selected customers for a two-day session of expert question-and-
answer sessions and small-group participant conversations.242  The outcomes 
 
Arkush, supra note 19, at 620 (arguing for enhanced democracy within administrative 
agencies, in which “public values should be reflected in or, to the extent possible, 
embodied by agency outcomes”); Cuéllar, supra note 19, at 417 (arguing that agencies 
should create new structures in which “regulators could systematically experiment 
with, and compare, different methods for blending public input with expert opinions 
about risk and science”). 
237. See sources cited supra note 220. 
238. Cf. Cynthia R. Farina et al., Knowledge in the People: Rethinking “Value” in Public Rulemaking 
Participation, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1185, 1187 (2012) (discussing the challenges of 
integrating citizens’ “situated knowledge” into technocratic agency proceedings). 
239. See FISHKIN, supra note 216, at 39–40. 
240. Public Utility Regulatory Act, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1446c (West 1995) 
(repealed 1999); 23 Tex. Reg. 6210, 6215 (June 12, 1998). 
241. KATE GALBRAITH & ASHER PRICE, THE GREAT TEXAS WIND RUSH 124–27 (2013); see also 
FISHKIN, supra note 216, at 99 (describing this effort in deliberative polling).  Lawrence 
Fishkin’s deliberative polling methodology engages a sample of representative citizens 
in facilitated discussions about a public policy topic.  Id. at 95. 
242. R.L. LEHR ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., LISTENING TO CUSTOMERS: HOW 
DELIBERATIVE POLLING HELPED BUILD 1,000 MW OF NEW RENEWABLE ENERGY PROJECTS IN 
TEXAS 2 (2003), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy03osti/33177.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9MY-
5APS]; PUB. UTIL. COMM’N OF TEXAS, REPORT TO THE 76TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE: THE SCOPE OF 
COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY IN TEXAS 4 (1999), http://www.puc.texas.gov/ 
104 67 UCLA L. REV. 56 (2020) 
of these eight separate polls proved surprising to many in the Texas utility 
industry.  As researchers who helped organize the polls later reported: 
The deliberative polling results validated what advocates of 
renewable energy, energy efficiency, and low-income assistance had 
argued for some time but could not necessarily prove: that 
customers support these public benefits expenditures and are 
willing to pay for them.243 
More specifically, participants in the deliberative polls indicated a strong 
preference for renewable energy and energy efficiency above all other sources, 
even if they cost more—and favored these sources more strongly after the 
deliberative poll than they did before it.244 
Perhaps these findings should not have been surprising, given what we 
now know about Americans’ energy preferences.245  But what is surprising to 
me is the extent to which state lawmakers then acted on them.  The polls had 
an immediate impact on Texas utilities’ willingness to pursue renewable 
energy investments.246  Moreover, many impute to these polls a significant 
role in Texas’s broader renewable energy development, as “the polling results 
took on an influence of their own in the ongoing legislative debate.”247  
Buoyed by the knowledge that Texans wanted renewable energy and were 
willing to pay for it, in 1999 the Texas legislature passed a landmark bill 




243. LEHR ET AL., supra note 242, at 9; see also GALBRAITH & PRICE, supra note 241. 
244. R.L. Lehr, W. Guild, D.L. Thomas, and B.G. Swezey report that energy preferences 
changed over the course of the polling, but energy values essentially remained the 
same—suggesting that education and conversation illuminated for participants how 
best to transform their values into concrete policy preferences.  LEHR ET AL., supra note 
242, at 3.  Kate Galbraith and Asher Price describe “the percentage of participants 
willing to pay more on monthly utility bills to support renewable energy—from $2 to 
$5 more . . . —jump[ing] from 52 percent to 84 percent, on average.”  GALBRAITH & 
PRICE, supra note 241, at 125. 
245. See supra notes 187–194 (on public energy preferences). 
246. See LEHR ET AL., supra note 242, at 9 (reporting that Texas’s deliberative polls helped utility 
representatives understand that people had sophisticated energy preferences). 
247. Id. 
248. See S. 7, 76th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1999) (mandating 3 percent by 2009, translated by 
the Public Utility Commission of Texas into an additional 2000 megawatts); see also 25 
Tex. Reg. 82, 104 (Jan. 7, 2000) (adopting a renewable energy goal for Texas and 
explaining that “[t]he Legislature’s commitment to development of the state’s abundant 
renewable resources is derived from the preferences expressed by Texas consumers in 
favor of renewable power” during integrated resource planning). 
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requirement, in turn, fueled the astounding “Texas Wind Rush” that 
continues today—with over 20,000 megawatts of wind now installed.249 
This example from Texas suggests that reforms to state planning laws 
may be an impactful way to incorporate citizen preferences into energy 
decisionmaking—without requiring a particularly dramatic shift in 
underlying roles or power structures.  Other states have maintained 
participation requirements for utility planning that resemble this antiquated 
Texas example, suggesting their enduring feasibility.  Most notably, Hawaii 
requires utilities to form advisory groups of citizens to help inform utility 
plans—a model that trades breadth of opinion for depth of engagement.250  
Many others at least nominally have a requirement of public participation,251 
which could be strengthened to deepen the quality of engagement.  These 
types of reforms, which reflect a general commitment to administrative 
democracy rather than preordaining any particular policy outcome, might 
prove capable of making inroads in states where climate change policy as such 
has limited chance of succeeding—particularly if distrust of utilities is 
prevalent in the state.252 
 
249. Ryan Maye Handy, Wind Power Blows Past Coal in Texas, HOUS. CHRON. (Dec. 4, 2017, 
10:17 AM), https://www.chron.com/business/energy/article/Wind-power-blows-past-coat-in-
Texas-12386751.php [https://perma.cc/494H-T7AC]. 
250. See WILSON & BIEWALD, supra note 223, at 27; see also In re Pub. Utils. Comm’n, No. 
2009–0108, 2011 WL 958735 (Haw. P.U.C. Mar. 14, 2011) (updating the rules 
regarding the role of advisory groups). 
251. The federal Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act asked (but did not require) states to 
consider including public participation within their utility planning rules, but not all 
states complied.  See 16 U.S.C. § 2621(a), (d) (2018); In re Investments in Conservation 
& Energy Efficiency by Elec. &/or Gas Utils., No. 8630, 1994 WL 810605 (Md. Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n Dec. 19, 1994) (declining to adopt the federal public participation 
requirements for Maryland planning efforts); In re Pub. Util. Regulatory Policies Act of 
1978, No. 5718, 1995 WL 261421, at *7 (Vt. Pub. Serv. Bd. Mar. 27, 1995) (finding 
that the requirement of a hearing complies with federal participation standard); see also 
Utility IRPs, CLEAN GRID ALLIANCE, https://cleangridalliance.org/our-work/utility-irps 
[https://perma.cc/B4JD-9L74] (“Although the specific requirements of resource planning 
varies state-by-state, most allow the public to submit comments and interested parties to file 
testimony or comments on the utility’s plan through a docket that is managed by a 
regulatory agency like a state public utilities commission.”). 
252. For example, South Carolina recently achieved significant changes to its integrated 
resource planning laws after the state’s utilities frustrated regulators, politicians, and 
consumers alike by sinking $9 billion into a failed nuclear power project.  See S.C. 
Energy Freedom Act of 2019, § 7, 2019 S.C. Acts 368, 386 (amending the state’s 
integrated resource planning requirements to mandate consideration of specific 
resources and to allow for interested intervenors to obtain “reasonable discovery after 
an integrated resource plan is filed in order to assist parties in obtaining evidence 
concerning the integrated resource plan, including the reasonableness and prudence of 
the plan and alternatives to the plan raised by intervening parties”); Herman K. 
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That said, I would not necessarily expect other states to replicate Texas’s 
responsivity based on mandated citizen engagement alone.253  Instead, I 
contend that the opening of utility planning processes should be paired with 
reforms that threaten nonresponsive utilities with the loss of real economic 
and political power, as discussed below in Subpart III.B. 
First, though, it is worth probing another aspect of Texas’s experience: 
the particular form of public engagement selected.  Although deliberative 
polling was not required by law, Texas’s utilities all chose to use it as a 
particularly meaningful gauge of customer values and preferences.254  Even 
Fishkin suggested that telephone polls would have been useless because “the 
public did not have the information, or even opinions about the issue worth 
consulting.”255  And indeed, consumer preferences did move over the course 
of the deliberative polls.256  These results suggest that perhaps states adopting 
similar rules should require utilities to use methods other than measuring 
static, point-in-time, individualized consumer preferences.257  On the flip 
side, research conducted since the time of Texas’s polling shows that while 
deliberation may enhance the strength of consumer preferences, even 
consumers participating in online polls show the same preference for 
renewable energy over fossil fuel energy.258  Accordingly, it may be worth 
allowing utilities some experimentation among modes of gauging consumer 
preferences before adopting a mandate that requires deliberation, which 
would surely raise the expense of the endeavor. 
B. Experiment With Enhanced Community Control of Energy 
My second proposal goes further than enhanced participation to suggest 
that states should at least experiment with reforms that empower 
 
Trabish, What’s Next For South Carolina’s Embattled Utilities?, UTIL. DIVE (Apr. 9, 
2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/whats-next-for-south-carolinas-embattled-
utilities/520838 [https://perma.cc/W84Y-6VA9] (describing the difficult dilemma of 
the state’s “embattled” utilities). 
253. See, e.g., In re Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 2011 WL 958735 (observing that “advisory group 
input is not adequately considered”). 
254. See supra notes 240–241. 
255. GALBRAITH & PRICE, supra note 241, at 124. 
256. See supra note 244 and accompanying text. 
257. See FISHKIN, supra note 216, at 121 (“More than two-thirds of all the attitude items in 
Deliberative Polls result in statistically significant net change.”); see also ARCHON FUNG, 
EMPOWERED PARTICIPATION: REINVENTING URBAN DEMOCRACY 17 (2004) (contrasting 
deliberative with “single choice” models). 
258. See ANSOLABEHERE & KONISKY, supra note 12, at 50.  Peoples’ attitudes on energy efficiency, 
however, appear to respond particularly strongly to deliberation.  See id. at 56. 
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communities to take over energy decisionmaking from their utilities.  This 
proposal stems from a conviction that particularly given the history of 
entrenched utility control over energy in the United States,259 any successful 
efforts to transform the sector must deconcentrate power and influence 
within U.S. energy governance.  Thus, even as states work to make the public 
utility commission model more responsive to citizen values, they should give 
communities options for dictating the shape of energy supply outside of this 
century-old framework.  In this Subpart, I explore the mechanics of local 
energy control and the theories that support broadened experimentation with 
these emerging tools. 
1. The Practicalities of Localizing Energy 
I first want to give a broad outline of the institutional mechanisms available 
to various communities for claiming more control over their energy supply.  
Options vary across the country depending both on the breadth of power granted 
to local communities by state legislation and on the structure of each state’s 
electricity system.  In some states that have restructured their electricity systems, 
private companies bid into markets to supply energy in the state, creating a 
competitive environment.260  Other states have retained a traditional, vertically 
integrated structure in which a single utility is in charge of electricity production 
(or procurement) and delivery.261  Approximately one-third of U.S. residents—
predominantly in the Southeast and the West—live in states that have opted out 
of restructuring and chosen to maintain this traditional model of electricity 
governance.262  I summarize briefly below the key methods of local energy control 
in both restructured and traditional states. 
In restructured states, the most potent tool that communities have for 
reclaiming control over their electricity grid is community choice aggregation 
(CCA).  In the nine states in which CCA is legally authorized,263 a community 
 
259. See HIRSH, supra note 222, at 9 (describing the twentieth-century “consensus” between 
regulated utilities and public utility commissions). 
260. See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 130, at 837–39. 
261. To complicate matters, there is also a third, mixed model.  For a thorough explanation, 
see Boyd & Carlson, supra note 130, at 838–39. 
262. See id. at 836.  For a map showing which states have restructured electricity to become a 
part of regional markets, see ISO/RTO COUNCIL, https://isorto.org/#about-section 
[https://perma.cc/5ZZY-CQ7J]. 
263. Those states are: California, Massachusetts, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, 
Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and Virginia. See ERIC O’SHAUGHNESSY ET AL., NAT’L 
RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., TECHNICAL REPORT NO. NREL/TP-6A20-72195, 
COMMUNITY CHOICE AGGREGATION: CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES, AND IMPACTS ON 
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can—after either a referendum or city council vote—announce its intention 
to take over its energy purchasing decisions from the local utility.264  The 
community then creates an entity (or contracts with an entity) that takes 
charge of negotiating the sources and prices of the community’s energy 
supply.265  Billing, transmission, and distribution remain the responsibility of 
the designated monopoly utility in the area, thus keeping some of the most 
technical aspects of electricity delivery in the hands of private experts.266 
In states that permit CCAs, communities’ purchasing decisions conform 
to research on the energy preferences of Americans.  In California, CCAs 
have elected to purchase renewable energy at rates far above the state-
mandated minimum of 50 percent renewable energy by 2030 (already a 
relatively ambitious target), and some have pursued additional initiatives 
aimed at low-income consumers and local energy.267  CCAs in Massachusetts 
and Ohio have, like in California, focused on improving efforts at green 
 
RENEWABLE ENERGY MARKETS, at v (2019), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy19osti/72195.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9K4A-PZRJ] (listing all except New Hampshire); S.B. 286, 2019 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (N.H. 2019). 
264. See LOCAL GOV’T COMM’N, COMMUNITY CHOICE AGGREGATION 1 (2015), https://www.lgc.org/ 
resources/community-design/lpu/may2015 [https://perma.cc/ TC6P-E2XE]. 
265. Id. (“[A] CCA is responsible for providing the energy commodity (i.e., the electrons 
themselves) to its constituents—which may or may not entail ownership of electric 
generating resources.”).  States typically subject CCAs to most—although perhaps not 
all—clean energy and energy efficiency laws and regulations, which means that CCAs 
cannot be used to dodge state climate or clean energy requirements.  See DESHAZO ET 
AL., supra note 223, at 11. 
266. See Community Choice Aggregation Offers Local Governments Affordable, Locally 
Controlled Clean Power, LOCAL GOV’T COMM’N (May 27, 2015), 
https://www.lgc.org/newsletter/may2015 [https://perma.cc/M7FU-GA3G] (“Under CCA 
legislation, local governments are allowed to provide electricity to their customers, 
however existing investor-owned utilities . . . still own and maintain the transmission 
and delivery systems.”). 
267. See Bentham Paulos, Should Investor-Owned Utilities Be Worried About Community Choice 
Aggregation?, POWER (May 1, 2017), https://www.powermag.com/should-investor-owned-
utilities-be-worried-about-community-choice-aggregation [https://perma.cc/ JCD4-2S7A] 
(observing that California CCA communities “want their renewables now, rather 
than waiting until 2030 for the state to reach its 50% renewables portfolio standard”).  
California’s first CCA—Marin Clean Energy, serving 255,000 customers—already gets 
75 percent of its energy from emission-free sources and plans to go carbon-free by 2025.  
Id.  On broader aims, see DESHAZO ET AL., supra note 223, at 26–27 (describing how CCAs 
promote projects that emphasize local energy and job creation); Maximilian Auffhammer, 
Rebates for Electric Clunkers?, ENERGY INST. BLOG (Apr. 30, 2018), 
https://energyathaas.wordpress.com/2018/04/30/rebates-for-electric-clunkers 
[https://perma.cc/8S5S-4XPR] (critiquing a CCA program subsidizing used electric 
vehicle purchases). 
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energy and energy efficiency.268  New York, which began its experiment with 
CCAs in 2015, reports that “nearly all” of the twenty-five participating 
municipalities in a CCA pilot project have elected a 100 percent renewable 
energy supply option as their default option for residents and small 
businesses and are delivering clean energy at rates lower than those charged 
by the displaced utility.269  As a mechanism for reflecting known citizen 
preferences regarding clean energy, these are promising early results. 
Despite their promise, CCA arrangements face limitations: They are 
only available to communities in states that have legislatively or regulatorily 
sanctioned them, and they can only be successful in restructured states—
where it is possible to purchase electricity from an entity other than the 
monopoly utility supplier.270  Nevertheless, there are possibilities for 
community-driven energy supply arrangements in states that have not yet 
embraced, or cannot embrace, CCA.271  One option is full-scale 
 
268. Ohio’s largest CCA, which serves 200 communities, recently began offering a 50 
percent renewable product without raising prices.  Paulos, supra note 267.  Cincinnati’s 
CCA has opted to purchase 100 percent renewable energy.  See Office of Env’t & 
Sustainability, Aggregation Program, CITY CIN., https://www.cincinnati-
oh.gov/oes/residential-programs/aggregation-program [https://perma.cc/4TVH-
GV7B] (“Cincinnati is the 1st aggregation program in the nation to offer 100% carbon 
free energy for both natural gas and electricity.”).  Massachusetts also boasts several 
established and emerging CCAs going beyond state legal requirements: The Cape Light 
CCA was created largely to pursue energy efficiency goals and has saved the region 
more than $485 million in electricity costs, and the Boston suburb of Brookline recently 
voted to create a CCA that will include 25 percent more renewables than the state as a whole.  
See GABRIELLE R. LICHTENSTEIN & INDIANA REID-SHAW, UNIV. OF N.H. SUSTAINABILITY INST., 
COMMUNITY CHOICE AGGREGATION (CCA) IN MASSACHUSETTS 20 (2017), 
https://sustainableunh.unh.edu/sites/sustainableunh.unh.edu/files/media/Fellows/lichtenstein_
-_aggregation_in_ma_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MHP-FNJK] (on Cape Light); 
Community Choice Aggregation, MASS CLIMATE ACTION NETWORK, 
https://www.massclimateaction.org/community_aggregation [https://perma.cc/BE3L-MMV7] 
(on Brookline). 
269. Motion to Enable Community Choice Aggregation Programs, No. 14-M-0224, 2016 
WL 1643338, at *2 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Apr. 21, 2016); N.Y. STATE ENERGY 
RESEARCH & DEV. AUTH., FACT SHEET - FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: COMMUNITY 
CHOICE AGGREGATION 1 (2019), https://www.nyserda.ny.gov/-/media/Files/Programs/ Clean-
Energy-Communities/cca-faq.pdf [https://perma.cc/QA7H-URC3].  Seventy additional 
New York towns are reportedly considering CCA, following its full authorization by state 
regulators in 2016.  Paulos, supra note 267. 
270. See Benjamin Mow, Community Choice Aggregation (CCA) Helping Communities Reach 
Renewable Energy Goals, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY (Sept. 19, 2017), 
https://www.nrel.gov/state-local-tribal/blog/posts/community-choice-aggregation-cca-
helping-communities-reach-renewable-energy-goals.html [https://perma.cc/8ZUH-XWKS]. 
271. For many people, community solar programs spring to mind as a solution here.  These 
proliferating programs allow residents of a locality to purchase a “share” of a locally sited 
renewable energy development under favorable price terms.  Community Solar, SOLAR 
ENERGY INDUSTRIES ASS’N, https://www.seia.org/initiatives/community-solar 
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municipalization—that is, the forced takeover of a utility by a community.272  
Although legally permitted in most states, municipalization is expensive and 
contentious, usually requiring condemnation proceedings to purchase 
expensive utility assets.273  Boulder, Colorado, is the first city to pursue 
municipalization as an avowed decarbonization strategy—and is in year five 
of the multimillion-dollar process.274  Few other cities appear to have an 
appetite for the kind of intense battle with the incumbent utility that 
municipalization requires. 
As a less contentious alternative, cities can draw from the playbook of 
corporate strategies on clean energy.  Mike Vandenbergh and Jonathan 
Gilligan have documented how private companies are succeeding in self-
generating and self-determining their energy supply on a notable scale.275  
Large corporations—particularly Apple, Microsoft, and Google—have been 
adept at negotiating special power purchase agreements (PPAs) that let them 
contract directly for renewable energy in places where the grid is “dirtier” 
than these companies prefer.276  Even in the notoriously slow-to-change 
 
[https://perma.cc/T4GW-YXBN] (cataloguing state community solar programs).  
Although valuable in expanding the range of people able to invest in solar energy, I do not 
consider these programs democratic in the same way as collective modes of community-
level energy decisionmaking, since they remain services run for the benefit of 
individual consumers that choose to subscribe.  See We+lton, supra note 21, at 602–11. 
272. See ABBY BRIGGERMAN ET AL., AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, SURVEY OF STATE MUNICIPALIZATION 
LAWS (2012), https://www.publicpower.org/system/files/documents/muncipalization-
survey_of_state_laws.pdf [https://perma.cc/54MA-7Y24]. 
273. See Welton, supra note 129, at 305–07. 
274. See id. (describing Boulder’s municipalization efforts); Anthony Hahn, Boulder Has ‘Two 
Agreements Done’ in Process of Muni Negotiations with Xcel, City Attorney Says, DAILY 
CAMERA (Feb. 26, 2018, 9:23 PM), http://www.dailycamera.com/news/boulder/ 
ci_31697170/boulder-municipalization-negotiations-xcel [https://perma.cc/G6DM-
2P6V] (detailing ongoing negotiations). 
275. VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 35, at 211–12. 
276. See BRC Deal Tracker, BUS. RENEWABLES CTR., http://businessrenewables.org/corporate-
transactions [https://perma.cc/7YYR-NGC3] (tracking growth in corporate renewable 
energy contracts).  One trade group reports that “[t]oday, more than 120 global 
corporations have committed to . . . go 100% renewable.”  Roger M. Freeman & James F. 
Boyle, Corporate Renewable Energy Breakthrough: VPPA 2.0 Benefits & Risks, SUSTAINABILITY 
ROUNDTABLE, INC. (Mar. 19, 2018), http://www.sustainround.com/ 2018/03/19/corporate-
renewable-energy-breaking-through-considering-the-benefits-risks-of-the-vppa-2-0-
executive-summary [https://perma.cc/T4SX-YZK4]; see also VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra 
note 35, at 211–12 (describing how firms with roots on the U.S. West Coast, including 
Amazon, Google, and Facebook, are greening their Southeastern data centers); Press 
Release, Microsoft News Center, Microsoft Announces Largest Wind Energy Purchase to 
Date (Nov. 14, 2016), https://news.microsoft.com/2016/11/14/microsoft-announces-largest-
wind-energy-purchase-to-date [https://perma.cc/7R6N-QW5V]; Sarah Penndorf, Renewable 
Energy Power Purchase Agreements, 3DEGREES (Feb. 5, 2018), https://3degreesinc.com/ppas-
power-purchase-agreements [https://perma.cc/2F2C-ARZK]. 
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Southeast, these corporations have demanded and received tailored rights to 
cleaner energy.277  Now, a number of traditionally regulated states have adopted 
“green tariffs” that explicitly grant large customers the right to enter into special 
arrangements to purchase renewable energy through the monopoly utility.278 
Many of these tariffs limit participation to large commercial and 
industrial customers.279  But what if cities could leverage the same power as 
Apple, Google, and Microsoft to force local renewable energy purchases 
through PPAs?  My proposal here rests on a conviction that such 
opportunities for reclaiming control over energy decisionmaking need not 
and should not be confined to corporations.  States could also extend green 
tariff rights to cities and towns acting on their citizens’ behalf to make group 
purchases—perhaps effectuated through a citywide vote to pursue more 
renewables than the state as a whole.280 
If states and utilities refuse to take these steps, cities can at least utilize 
the corporate strategy of virtual power purchase agreements (VPPAs).  
VPPAs are agreements between a purchaser and a renewables developer, 
wherein the purchaser pays the developer for the right to claim credit for the 
green attributes of renewable power that enters the grid without directly 
consuming the power itself.281  VPPAs have the benefit of not requiring a facility 
 
277. VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 35, at 3–5. 
278. See PRIYA BARUA & CELINA BONUGLI, WORLD RES. INST., EMERGING GREEN TARIFFS IN 
U.S. REGULATED ELECTRICITY MARKETS 4 (2018), https://buyersprinciples.org/wp-
content/uploads/Green-Tariffs-Oct-2018-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/WTJ2-A2PW] 
(providing a map of green tariff states and states where corporations have obtained 
special renewables deals in the absence of a green tariff). 
279. To date, several utilities’ green tariff programs allow for city governments to participate 
as large customers so as to supply government-owned buildings with renewable 
energy—but these programs do not let a city aggregate demand on behalf of its 
residents.  See, e.g., Press Release, Ameren Missouri, Ameren Missouri Offers Innovative 
New Program for Cities and Businesses to Achieve Renewable Energy Goals (June 27, 2018), 
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/ameren-missouri-offers-innovative-new-
program-for-cities-and-businesses-to-achieve-renewable-energy-goals-300673539.html 
[https://perma.cc/X7PQ-C872] [hereinafter Ameren Missouri Press Release]; Press 
Release, Puget Sound Energy, PSE’s Green Direct Program is Fully Subscribed (Oct. 16, 
2018), https://www.pse.com/press-release/details/green-direct-announcement 
[https://perma.cc/D2HR-U4XZ]. 
280. Virginia has proposed legislation to this effect.  See H.D. 1590, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (Va. 2018) (proposing to amend the state’s aggregation rules to allow 
municipalities to demand particular types of energy from their utilities).  A bill that 
passed the Utah legislature in 2019 requires the incumbent utility to work with any 
communities that adopt a 100% clean energy commitment to help them meet their target. See 
Community Renewable Energy Act, H.B. 411, 2019 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2019).  
281. Typically, virtual power purchase agreements (VPPAs) take the form of a contract for 
differences, under which the seller is guaranteed a certain price for renewable energy, 
with the buyer paying the seller if the market price falls short, and the seller paying 
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to be sited close enough for actual energy consumption, since the purchaser is 
simply paying for the guarantee of having renewable energy delivered onto 
the U.S. grid, rather than purchasing the green electrons themselves.282  And 
because VPPAs implicate financial transactions rather than actual physical 
energy transfers, purchasers can use them across states with all types of 
electricity market designs.283 
Led by the mayor of Boston, many cities across the country—including 
several in red states—have announced their intention to partner in adopting 
this VPPA model for a largescale joint renewable energy purchase.284  
Through programs like these, cities can gain the right to satisfy their 
residents’ goals by collectively obtaining clean energy, rather than relying on 
interested individual subscribers.  Such efforts might provide an outlet, even 
in traditionally regulated states, for communities to gain enhanced control 
over the source of their energy. 
2. The Virtues of Local Energy Control 
At first blush, these city- and town-led efforts may sound like just 
another downscaling workaround.  But I see these efforts as distinct from 
other city-driven actions on climate change for two reasons.  First, seizing 
control over energy supply at the local level represents an aggrandizement of 
the city sphere of control, since energy supply decisions are traditionally 
made at the state level by public utility commissions and regulated utilities.285  
Community control of energy thus represents more than just downscaling to 
 
the buyer if the market price exceeds the contractual price.  See Freeman & Boyle, 
supra note 276; FRED LOWTHER & JOAN BONDAREFF, BLANK ROME LLP, USE OF A 
VIRTUAL POWER PURCHASE AGREEMENT (VPPA): THE NEW WAY TO ACQUIRE GREEN 
CREDITS (2018), https://www.blankrome.com/sites/default/files/2018-05/financing_ 
projects_with_virtual_power_purchase_agreements_vppa.pdf [https://perma.cc/C88A-
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local levels of action—it is an enhancement of the potency of local action 
itself.  Second, city control over energy supply can be promoted and 
accomplished for reasons having nothing to do with climate change and 
decarbonization—and thus may prove an appealing energy management 
strategy even in locales not willing to adopt climate change policies as such.286 
City-led efforts offer dual modes of citizen empowerment.  First, they 
may serve to enhance the quantity and quality of citizen participation in 
energy decisionmaking.  By creating new, local outlets for conversations 
about energy supply, cities may encourage people to feel that participation 
can actually make a difference—a feeling that most people distinctly do not 
possess with respect to communications with their investor-owned utility.287  
Notably, New York’s energy regulators sanctioned CCA largely on this 
participation-inducing logic.288 
Of course, many remain skeptical that localization of decisionmaking 
necessarily creates more broad-based, representative participation.289  When 
it comes to CCAs, there is no fieldwork available to confirm or refute 
regulators’ and advocates’ hunches about participation levels or character.  I 
thus do not rest my argument on an assertion that CCA or other forms of 
local control necessarily induce greater and better participation—although I 
believe there are reasons to predict they might. 
I see these city-led efforts as providing a second and different benefit to 
energy governance that extends beyond city limits.  What CCAs and PPAs give to 
a community is the economic power to structure their own energy supply.  In this 
way, CCAs and similar arrangements serve what K. Sabeel Rahman has suggested 
is one of the primary purposes of “democratic institutional design”: “to rebalance 
political power.”290  By exercising their purchasing power to favor certain 
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resources over others, communities gain economic leverage over the types of 
energy resources being developed in their state or region.  They can also insist on 
integrating a broader set of goals into energy policy—as many communities have 
done through their focus on local job creation or equitable access to clean energy 
as components of their purchasing strategies.291 
In this way, cities serve as proving grounds for different visions of a 
decarbonized energy system.  But they are doing more than just “dissenting 
by deciding,” in the words of Heather Gerken.292  Gerken has theorized that 
allowing local control over decisions can be important in creating space for 
outcomes different from those reached on the state or national level293—a 
theory that holds true here.  But more is at work than mere dissent: Cities that 
take control of their energy supply necessarily do so at the diminishment of 
some investor-owned utility’s service territory and revenue stream.  By 
cutting into the economic power of monopoly utilities, these cities—
particularly as they accrue in number—gain real political power at the state 
level, while diminishing the power of the monopoly utility lobby.294  This 
rebalanced power dynamic might work to correct the double democratic 
deficit facing decarbonization policy by shifting the responsiveness of state 
government—and perhaps ultimately, the federal government—toward city-
expressed preferences, away from utility preferences. 
An example may help to concretize this point.  Since 2010, California 
has witnessed a profusion of communities, large and small, electing to take 
control over their energy supply.295  California regulators now project that by 
the mid-2020s, an astounding 85 percent of retail load will no longer be 
supplied by investor-owned utilities.296  Not only are these communities 
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going above and beyond state mandates in their own renewable purchases,297 
but the shifting power dynamics they create in the energy sector also 
influence statewide energy debates.  In fall 2018, California adopted landmark 
legislation to move to 100 percent clean energy by 2045—an effort that was 
reportedly aided by the “ambitious renewable goals of CCAs.”298  In this way, 
it appears that greater citizen control over energy supply (in my parlance, the 
“how” of decarbonization) helped propel statewide acceptance of a more 
stringent mandatory decarbonization target. 
C. Complementary Modes of Reform 
The two strategies I have outlined in this Part—enhancing citizen 
participation in utility planning and empowering community control of 
energy decisionmaking—work through different theories of the role of the 
citizen in energy governance.  The first rests upon a model of enhanced 
citizen engagement; the second upon a model of citizen empowerment that 
shifts decisionmaking control from public utilities and their state oversight 
bodies to local communities.  I see this dual-pronged approach to reforming 
energy governance as a particular strength of these proposals. 
These two reforms, pursued in concert, could help overcome the 
weaknesses that each faces on its own.  Above, I extolled the virtues of 
community control over energy supply, but there are three downsides to 
overemphasizing this strategy alone.   
First, community-focused schemes often drive investment in small-scale 
technologies or shares of proven larger-scale technologies.  They do not focus 
on promising but still-emerging largescale decarbonization strategies such as 
next-generation nuclear power and offshore wind corridors.299  Although 
small-scale strategies like rooftop solar and robust energy efficiency programs 
can play a critical role in decarbonization, investment in the next generation 
of larger-scale technologies will be necessary to achieve the deeply 
decarbonized future that many CCA communities desire.300  A piecemeal 
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pursuit of local energy initiatives might end up neglecting these important 
investments.301  Indeed, California has recently become concerned that its 
proliferation of CCAs will cause the state to fall short on the investment in 
new renewable energy technologies that the state needs to reach its 100 
percent clean energy goals.302  For this reason, it is considering legislation to 
establish a backstop state procurement system that would make investments 
in clean energy sources it deemed necessary for achieving state goals, but 
which CCAs and other retail providers were not supporting.303  This remedial 
legislation hints at the possibility that a state can go too far in dispersing its 
energy decisionmaking authority in the service of clean energy goals—
although California is the only state currently near this precipice. 
Second, local strategies can give residents a false sense of confidence that they 
have done their bit to clean up the energy supply.  In point of fact, local initiatives 
often displace dirty energy to other locales, rather than replace it completely.304  If 
engagement existed only on the community scale—and  not every community 
chose to assert control—the grid could patchwork into 100 percent fossil fuel and 
100 percent renewable areas, without changing overall emissions. 
Finally, largescale defection from utility-driven energy purchasing 
creates a set of fairness challenges.  When entities assert control over their 
own energy supply and thereby leave their utility, it leaves the remaining costs 
of utility service to be spread over a smaller population of remaining 
consumers, whose bills might rise as a result.305  Often, these costs include 
some unavoidable expenses that were incurred on behalf of a community 
exiting utility service.306  In particular, if a utility entered long-term contracts 
under the assumption it would serve a much larger load, there are important 
questions regarding whether communities or corporations exiting utility 
service should bear some portion of the costs of these contracts.307  Moreover, 
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exiting corporations and communities may be wealthier than those 
remaining with their utility—such that their exit may leave a less affluent 
group of customers to finance socially beneficial utility programs such as low-
income affordability programs and energy efficiency improvements.308 
For these reasons, I believe it ill-advised to move entirely to a 
decentralized model for control of energy supply.  City-led purchasing efforts 
are worthy experiments to help push the grid away from the sclerotic, central-
utility model that has dominated for too long.  But the ideal future probably 
does not entail complete localization of energy decisionmaking; instead, I see 
an enduring role for publicly managed, privately operated utilities in the 
decarbonized grid, especially if they can be made more internally responsive 
to citizen preferences.309  These utilities, which often span multiple states, 
offer the scale of energy demand and financial resources necessary to pursue 
largescale decarbonization efforts. 
That said, overreliance on utilities alone as the drivers of this transition 
carries its own risks.  The “natural monopoly” status of many of these 
corporations—whereby we assume that it is logically best to have only one 
utility serve each area310—gives them tremendous political power.  To date, 
many utilities have used this power to thoroughly and successfully resist 
change in the energy sector.311  Given this history, there is limited reason to 
believe that utilities would suddenly display widespread willingness to accept 
citizen demands for cleaner electricity, even if required to gauge this demand 
during utility planning. 
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Here is where citizen empowerment through community control serves 
as a critical complement: The specter of widespread community defection 
forces utilities to pay more attention to citizen demands.  As a case in point, 
California utilities now view CCAs as an existential threat to their business 
models.312  But one of the best ways to keep a community from defecting is to 
give the people what they want.  Accordingly, community procurement 
strategies put pressure on utilities to accept increased renewable energy 
targets, energy efficiency programming, or rooftop solar to appease 
communities that otherwise might choose to exit utility service.313  This 
pressure dynamic is playing out across the country: For example, in Utah, 
Missouri, Kansas, and Nevada, utilities have agreed to increase statewide 
renewables goals or are negotiating special clean energy arrangements for 
cities in order to avoid laws that would catalyze more community control 
over energy.314  In this way, strategies of community control offer a structural 
intervention in the world of energy economics and energy politics, by 
providing a threatening counterweight to utility power that may be capable of 
forcing broader systemic changes.315 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that there are underappreciated ways in which 
better involvement of citizens in the project of U.S. energy governance could 
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help address the climate change crisis.  It is high time we try trusting that 
giving people, instead of corporations, control over the shape of 
decarbonization may yield better results.  Tools that build citizen engagement 
with, and control over, decarbonization may be slow, and they may be 
piecemeal.  However, given the dearth of response at the federal level right 
now,316 it is worth adding these citizen-centered strategies to the grab bag of 
climate workarounds currently being deployed—in the hope that they may 
become the driver of more enduring, profound changes. 
Even if a more participatory turn in energy governance does not 
produce the results I have predicted in terms of decarbonization, something 
might be gained.  Community-centered energy policy may help to forge new 
political arrangements among neighbors and call upon citizens to discuss 
their community values together.317  This enhanced community cohesion may 
become all the more critical if decarbonization efforts fail and we are left with a 
“Hothouse Earth,” in which runaway geophysical processes threaten “health, 
economies, political stability . . . and ultimately, the habitability of the planet for 
humans.”318  In that case, the task will be to figure out how to cope, as individuals 
or communities, with the havoc of storms, drought, famine, flooding, and 
massive human displacement that is predicted to attend this warmer world.319  A 
community that has practiced more democratic engagement might, at the least, 
give itself more coping tools for this warming world.320  
But efforts to involve citizens in energy decisionmaking should be 
understood as more than good preparation for doomsday.  We do not know the 
runaway tipping point at which climate change becomes rapid and irreversible.321  
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What we do know is that every ton of emissions reductions that helps us stay 
below that tipping point is some incremental bit of suffering averted.322  For this 
reason, it is worth celebrating any climate progress that more citizen involvement 
could bring to the project of decarbonization. 
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